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THE MYTH OF EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL FOREIGN
AFFAIRS POWER

MICHAEL D. RAMSEY*
Over sixty years ago in United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport
Corp.,' the U.S. Supreme Court posited a peculiar notion of the
source of federal power in foreign affairs. Justice Sutherland,
speaking for the Court, said that federal power in this area does not
arise as federal power is ordinarily understood to arise-namely,
from a grant of power by the express or implied terms of the U.S.
Constitution. Rather, said Sutherland, federal power in foreign
affairs is extraconstitutional: "the powers of external sovereignty
...

if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would

have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants
of nationality.... [They] exist as inherently inseparable from the
conception of nationality."2
Curtiss-Wrightis a striking departure from the usual view of
constitutional law, which holds that the federal government is one
of enumerated powers and, as Madison said, "delegation alone

* Professor of Law, University of San Diego Law School. Thanks to the University of
San Diego for providing financial support for research, and to my colleagues for helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
1. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
2. Id. at 318. For an engaging summary of the argument, see Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN
A mFAiRs
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 16-22 (2d ed. 1996). The theory was not
entirely original with Sutherland; something of this sort was suggested with respect to the
power over immigration in Chae ChanPingv. UnitedStates, 130 U.S. 581,603-04 (1889) and
Fong Yue Ting v. UnitedStates, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893), and with respect to acquisition of
territory in Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890). See Sarah H. Cleveland, The
PlenaryPowerBackground of Curtiss-Wright, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1127 (1999) (discussing
the origins of the idea of extraconstitutional foreign affairs power). Sutherland expressed
similar views beforejoiningthe Court in GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTTIoNALPOWERAND
WoRLD AFFAmS (1919). See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional
Regime of ForeignRelations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 46-62 (1999) (discussing the evolution of
Sutherland's thought). However, Curtiss-Wright was the Court's first assertion of a
generalized extraconstitutional foreign affairs power.
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warrants the exercise of any power."3 It runs contrary to the plain
language of the Tenth Amendment (declaring that the "powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution" are reserved to
the states or to the people4 ) and seems inconsistent with numerous
statements to the same effect made during the debates over the
ratification of the Constitution.5 Not surprisingly, it has invited
vigorous dispute. Much academic labor has been devoted to
proving Curtiss-Wrightwrong,6 but none of these efforts has met
unqualified success: despite its difficulties, the case still has
prominent defenders and remains a centerpiece of academic7 and
3. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 620 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2ded. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT, DEBATES]
(statement of James Madison to the Virginia Ratifying Convention).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
5. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supranote 3, at 424-25 (statement ofJames Wilson to
the Pennsylvania Convention that the federal government consists only of enumerated
powers and that failure to enumerate a power would cause it to be outside the government's
authority); 3 iaL at 620 (statement ofJames Madison to the Virginia Convention denying that
"the general government [could] exercise any power not delegated"); 4 id. at 259 (statement
of Charles Pinckney to the South Carolina Convention that "no power could be executed, or
assumed, [by the federal government] but such as were expressly delegated"); 13 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 339 (John P. Kaminski

& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (public address by
James Wilson in Philadelphia, 1787, stating that "every thingwhichis not given, is reserved"
to the states).
6. For leading recent criticism ofCurtiss-Wright,see for example, MICHAELJ. GLENNON,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 18-34 (1990) (criticizing the historical and logical foundations
of Curtiss-Wright);HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONALSECURITYCONSTITUTION: SHARING

POWERAFrERTHEIRAN-CONTRAAFFAIR94 (1990) (describing"witheringcriticism" ofCurtissWright);Jack L. Goldsmith, FederalCourts, ForeignAffairs andFederalism,83 VA. L. REV.
1617, 1659(1997) (describing Curtiss-Wrightas "the batenoire ofU.S. foreign relations law").
For attacks specifically upon Curtiss-Wright'stheory of extraconstitutional power in foreign
affairs, see David At Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice
Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946) (criticizing Sutherland's historical claims);
Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical

Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973) (same); C. Perry Patterson, In re The United States v.
The Curtiss-WrightCorporation(pts. 1 & 2) 22 TEx. L. REV. 286,445 (1944) (same).
7. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law:A StructuralReinterpretation,144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1245, 1296-97 (1996) (relying on Curtiss-Wright to conclude that "[wihereas the
federal government's authority over internal affairs is derived exclusively from the
Constitution, 'the powers ofexternal sovereignty [do] not depend upon the affirmative grants
of the Constitution.' Rather, such powers are 'vested in the federal government as necessary
concomitants of nationality"); Karl Manheim, State Immigration Laws and Federal
Supremacy, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 939, 940-41 (1995) (relying on Curtiss-Wright,rather
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judicial8 discussions of federal foreign affairs power.
Nonetheless, Curtiss-Wright is demonstrably wrong as a historical matter, and it is wrong for reasons that have escaped the
central focus of many attacks upon it. As set forth below, whatever

else one thinks of Curtiss-Wright, it wrongly describes the
understanding of the drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution.

There was no theory of extraconstitutional power in foreign affairs
at the time the Constitution was drafted and ratified. To the

contrary, the Constitution's drafters and ratifiers understood the
Constitution as the means to give the national government foreign
relations power it would otherwise lack.
Surprisingly, no academic study has comprehensively considered
the 1787-89 understanding of the source of foreign affairs power.
Instead, criticism of Curtiss-Wright focuses upon different time
periods or broader issues, upon which consensus has proved
impossible. As a result, Curtiss-Wrighthas survived despite widespread attacks upon it. Once the focus is narrowed to the 1787-89
understanding of foreign affairs power, however, it should be
demonstrable beyond dispute that Curtiss-Wright is wrong upon

this point. Further, because Curtiss-Wright's reasoning depends
than the Constitution, to conclude that "federalism, and all of its attendant implications for
reserved powers in the states, is simply an inapposite construct when it comes to the external
affairs of the nation. Tower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in
the national government exclusively'"); Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union
Reconsidered:AHistoricalRefutation ofState Sovereignty over Seabeds, 74 COLUM. L. REv.
1056, 1060-68 (1974) (explicitly defending Curtiss-Wright's theory of extraconstitutional
powers on historical grounds); see also HENKIN, supra note 2, at 16-22 (giving qualified
endorsement of Curtiss-Wrighton pragmatic grounds); JACKN. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS
OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 173-74
n.* (1979) (endorsing Professor Morris's historical view).
8. For prominent judicial citations of Curtiss-Wright,see Clintonv. City ofNew York,
524 U.S. 417, 445-46 (1998) (citing Curtiss-Wright as evidence of the President's broad
discretion in foreign affairs); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993)
(same); Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 354 n.28 (1990) (quoting with
approval Curtiss-Wrightsassertion of extraconstitutional power in foreign affairs); Webster
v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 605-06 (1988) (citing Curtiss-Wrightin support ofthe Presidents broad
role in foreign affairs); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (citing Curtiss-Wright as
evidence ofthe federal government's "broad authority over foreign affairs"); National Foreign
Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 50 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting with approval CurtissWright's observations about extraconstitutional power in foreign affairs), affd on other
groundssub nom., Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000); see also
Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 392-93 (7th Cir. 1998) (referring to the inconclusive
historical debate over Curtiss-Wright),vacated in part,165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1999).
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upon the claim that the Constitution was drafted against a
background of extraconstitutional powers in foreign affairs, once
that claim is rejected Curtiss-Wright as a whole becomes indefensible.
Prior criticism of Curtiss-Wright has failed to discredit the
opinion conclusively, in part because that criticism has claimed too
much. First, Curtiss-Wright'scritics often address not the question
of extraconstitutional power, but the opinion's secondary claim that
the President (as opposed to Congress) should have a predominant
role in foreign affairs.9 Proponents of congressional leadership in
foreign affairs have made powerful arguments in this regard," but
in spite of the attention given it, the matter remains debatable.
It is clear, at least as a practical matter, that the President does
play a leading role in foreign affairs, and has done so since the
founding."1 But the case against Curtiss-Wrightneed not turn upon
the scope of presidential authority in foreign affairs. The truly
radical part of Curtiss-Wright is not its emphasis on presidential
power, but rather its claim that that power arose outside the
Constitution.
Curtiss-Wright's critics have also tried to prove more than
necessary in the area of state sovereignty. In so doing, they, as well
as those who defend the opinion, focus upon the wrong time period.
Specifically, they look not to 1787-89, but to the period surrounding
independence more than a decade earlier. Part of Curtiss-Wright's
theory was that the states were never fully sovereign. They passed,
in Curtiss-Wright'sview, from being colonies to being subnational
units in the newly independent Union, and so never had foreign
affairs power, which is an attribute of full sovereignty.' Attacks on
9. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936)
(discussing presidential power).
10. See, e.g., GLENNON, supranote 6, at 16-34; KOH, supra note 6, at 94.

11. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President's Authority over
ForeignAffairs,40 WM. &MARYL. REV. 1471 (1999) (discussing presidential authority in the

years following ratification of the Constitution); H. Jefferson Powell, The President's
Authority over ForeignAffairs, An Executive BranchPerspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV 527

(1999) [hereinafter Powell, Executive Branch Perspective] (discussing modem scope of
presidential authority in foreign affairs).
12. Specifically, Curtiss-Wrightargued that if the states were never fully sovereign, they
never possessed foreign affairs power, and therefore foreign affairs power could not have
been delegated to the federal government by the states in the Constitution; because the
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Curtiss-Wright argue that the states at one point were full
sovereigns, and therefore Curtiss-Wrightcannot be correct on this
point.'" But the former proposition is widely disputed, as there are
two competing historical theories about what hi7ppened at the
moment of independence: that the states became independent
separately and then created the Union, and that the Union declared
independence and so established the collective independence of the
states.'4 Moreover, the debate has far-reaching implications in other
areas, such as claims of states' rights based on inherent state
sovereignty and claims of inherent federal powers in other fields. 5
Because the historical attack on Curtiss-Wrighthas depended upon
establishing the historical priority of the states-with consequent
implications for state sovereignty-it has proved unpersuasive to
those committed to the alternate historical reading; those skeptical
of state sovereignty cling to Curtiss-Wright,not so much for what
it says about foreign affairs powers, but for what is says about state
versus federal power in general.
A further difficulty is that critics of Curtiss-Wrighthave not gone
far enough in one respect: they have not offered a constitutional
alternative to the theory of extraconstitutional foreign affairs
power. Curtiss-Wrightis attractive, despite its drawbacks, because
it appears to answer three difficult questions regarding foreign
affairs: the source of federal foreign affairs power, the allocation of

federal government must have foreign affairs power, and this power was not delegated by the
states, it must arise from some other source. See Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 317-18; infra
part L.A (discussing this claim).
13. See, e.g., Levitan, supranote 6, at 478-90; Lofgren, supranote 6, at 12-20; Patterson,
supra note 6, at 297-308, 445-56; see also Morris, supra note 7, at 1060-68 (taking the
opposing view of the history).
14. For a summary of the historical debate, ultimately sympathetic to the nationalist
side, see RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 173-74.
15. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711-60 (1999) (concluding that states have
inherent sovereign immunity in partbased on the states' historical status as full sovereigns);
id. at 760-814 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that states lack sovereign immunity in part
because they were never fully sovereign); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
802-05 (1995) (concluding that states lack inherent power to impose term limits in
congressional elections); id. at 845-57 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding that since states
were originally fully sovereign they retain this inherent power). On the broader contours of
the inherent sovereignty debate, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty andFederalism,96
YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
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federal foreign affairs power, and the extent of the foreign affairs
power of the states.
First, where does the federal government get its foreign affairs
powers that are not specifically listed in the Constitution? Of
course, the Constitution allocates a number of key foreign affairs
powers, including the power to declare war, send and receive
ambassadors, and enter into treaties.'" But other foreign affairs
powers seem to be missing.'7 Curtiss-Wright obviates the need to
search constitutional text for additional powers-for if it is correct,
those powers are held by the federal government irrespective of the
Constitution.
Curtiss-Wright also resolves the allocation of federal foreign
affairs powers. As the Constitution seemingly fails to mention
numerous foreign affairs powers, obviously it gives no immediate
clue as to their allocation. In the absence of contrary indications,
the President may appear the logical locus of many foreign affairs
powers, for numerous practical and structural reasons." 8 The
Constitution may not appear to make that allocation in so many
words, but if foreign affairs powers are extraconstitutional, we need
not be concerned about that omission. Lacking explicit guidance,
foreign affairs powers may be allocated where they most logically
9
seem to belong. This is the conclusion reached in Curtiss-Wright,
20
and the case continues to be widely cited for this proposition.
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2, 3.
17. As Louis Henkin summarizes:
[Viery much about foreign relations went without or with little saying....
Where-for random examples-is the power to recognize other states or

governments; to maintain or rupture diplomatic relations; to open consulates
in other countries and permit foreign governments to establish consulates in
the United States; to acquire or cede territory;, to grant or withhold foreign aid;

to proclaim a Monroe Doctrine, an Open-Door Policy, or a Reagan Doctrine;
indeed to determine all the attitudes and carry out all the details in the
myriads ofrelationships with other nations that are 'the foreign policy' and 'the
foreign relations' of the United States? ... These 'missing' powers, and a host
of others, were clearly intended for, and have always been exercised by, the
federal government, but where does the Constitution say that it shall be so?
HENEIN, supra note 2, at 14-15.
18. See Powell, Executive Branch Perspective, supra note 11, at 527 (discussing
advantages of presidential power in foreign relations).
19. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
20. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,445 (1998); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 606 (1988); see also
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Further, it may seem intuitive that
[fWoreign affairs are national affairs. The United States is a
single nation-state and it is the United States (not the states of
the Union, singly or together) that has relations with other
nations; and the United States Government (not the
governments of the states) conducts those relations and makes
national foreign policy.2
But where, exactly, does the Constitution say this? The states are
precluded from certain aspects of foreign affairs (such as war and
treatymaking) by particular clauses of the Constitution, 22 but there
is no obvious generalized exclusion of states from matters affecting
foreign affairs. True, the Supreme Court held in Zschernig v.
Miller" that there is some sort of generalized preclusion, but
Zschernigand its defenders have been embarrassed by the inability
to point to any actual source of this preclusion beyond structural
intuition.2 4 Curtiss-Wright again provides a solution: if foreign
affairs powers are "concomitants of nationality"2 5 then of course
they exist only in the federal government, which is the only entity
possessing nationalsovereignty. Thus Curtiss-Wrightprovides an
easy resolution of threshold questions to which we have an intuitive
response but which, based on the Constitution alone, we may find
extraordinarily nettlesome in the proof.
]KOH, supra note 6, at 134-49 (discussing the importance of Curtiss-Wright to claims of

presidential power in foreign affairs).
21. HENKIN, supranote 2, at 13. For leading analyses concluding that the Constitution
precludes states from acting in foreign affairs, see Howard N. Fenton, III, The Fallacyof
Federalismin ForeignAffairs: State and Local ForeignPolicyTrade Restrictions,13 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & BUS. 563 (1993); Harold G. Maier, Preemption of State Law: A Recommended
Analysis, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 832 (1989); David Schmahmann & James Finch, The
UnconstitutionalityofState andLocal Enactments in the UnitedStatesestrictingBusiness
Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 175 (1997). For the opposing view,
see Goldsmith, supranote 6; Michael D. Ramsey, The Powerofthe States inForeignAffairs:
The Original Understandingof ForeignPolicy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 341
(1999); Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigrationin an EraofDemi-Sovereignties, 35 VA.
J. INT'L L. 121 (1994).
22. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10.
23. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
24. See HENKIN, supranote 2, at 162-65 (discussing Zschernig); Ramsey, supra note 21,
at 356-69 (same).
25. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
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This Article takes a new perspective on Curtiss-Wrightin each of
the foregoing respects. It is not concerned with the extent of the
President's power in foreign affairs, and indeed ultimately suggests
that Curtiss-Wright'sview of presidential power may have some
constitutional basis. It is not concerned with the historical priority
of state and federal sovereignty, nor with the historical existence
or nonexistence of the states as sovereign entities (in foreign
affairs or otherwise) in the early years of independence. Rather, for
purposes of discussion this Article assumes that Curtiss-Wright's
historical defenders may be correct in their view of what happened
at the moment of independence-that is, that the states were never
full sovereigns.2" Instead, it is specifically concerned with the 178789 understanding of the source of federal foreign affairs power.
With the question so narrowed, I argue that Curtiss-Wrightcan be
rejected conclusively. Finally, this Article considers the
constitutional regime of foreign affairs powers in the absence of
Curtiss-Wright.As indicated above, much of the allure of CurtissWright may be that it provides a framework for foreign affairs law
that the Constitution seems to lack. A convincing rejection of
Curtiss-Wrightmust also provide an alternative explanation of the
source and distribution of foreign affairs power. Although the
details of that project are beyond the scope of this Article, I argue
that it is possible to make sense of foreign affairs law from the text
and structure of the Constitution, and thus we should not unduly
fear the demise of the theory of extraconstitutionality.
Part I begins the discussion with an overview of the CurtissWright theory and its critics. Parts II-IV examine the constitutional
text, the Articles of Confederation, the Constitutional Convention,
the ratification debates, and related contemporaneous and nearcontemporaneous events to conclude that the thinking of the
constitutional generation was based upon the premise that foreign
affairs powers, like other powers, were allocated between the state
and federal governments by the terms of the nation's governing
document. I therefore conclude that there are no easy answers to
the Constitution's foreign affairs conundrums: Curtiss-Wright,
though convenient, is not a defensible solution to the dilemma of
constitutionally unallocated foreign affairs powers. Finally, Part V
26. See Morris, supra note 7, at 1068-89.
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suggests that the general outlines of the allocation of powers in
foreign affairs can be discerned from the Constitution itself.
Recourse to an extraconstitutional theory, as invited by CurtissWright, is not only ahistorical but unnecessary.
I. CURTISS-WRIGHT AND ITS CRITICS
A. The Theory of ExtraconstitutionalForeignRelations Power
In 1934, President Franklin Roosevelt declared an embargo on
arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay, which were then at war over
disputed territory.2 7 He acted pursuant to a joint resolution of
Congress authorizing the President to declare an embargo if in the
judgment of the President such action would promote peace
between the combatants.'s The United States subsequently
prosecuted the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation forviolating the
embargo; in its defense the company asserted, among other things,
that the embargo was invalid because the Act authorizing it was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the President.
This portion of the case reached the Supreme
Court in 1936 as
29
United States v. Curtiss-WrightExport Corp.
Only a year before, the Court had overturned congressional
legislation in other areas because it gave too much discretion to the
President."0 The delegation in Curtiss-Wright seemed similarly
unconstrained, and to uphold it the Court needed an explanation for
why it differed from prior impermissible delegations. Justice
Sutherland, writing for the Court, argued that because the
President already had broad power in foreign affairs, legislation in
that field could grant more discretion than in domestic matters, and
thus the Court's prior domestic delegation cases did not apply."' But
27. See Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 311-12.
28. See Joint Resolution of May 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 811 (authorizing the President to
declare an embargo "if the President finds that the prohibition of the sale of arms and

munitions ofwar in the United States to those countries now engaged in armed conflict in
the Chaco may contribute to the reestablishment of peace between those countries").
29. See Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 311-15 (recounting the history of the case).
30. See Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating a
portion of the National Industrial Recovery Act as an unconstitutional delegation of power
to the President); Panama Refining Corp. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (same).
31. See Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 319-20.
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this reasoning faced a different problem: nothing in the
Constitution said, in so many words, that the President had broad
power in foreign affairs, and the powers specifically granted to the
President did not seem to encompass the embargo power at issue in
Curtiss-Wright.To get around this difficulty, Sutherland turned to
the theory of extraconstitutional power in foreign affairs. If foreign
affairs power arose outside of the Constitution, the Constitution's
failure to mention the President's broad power in foreign affairs did
not mean that it did not exist. As a result, Sutherland relied heavily
upon the idea of extraconstitutionality, even though the case itself
concerned a matter (regulation of foreign commerce)
quite plainly
32
within the constitutional powers of Congress.
Curtiss-Wrightwas, moreover, an originalist opinion. Sutherland
claimed to base his theory of extraconstitutionality upon the
understanding of the framers of the Constitution with respect
to sovereignty and the structure of the federal government.'
Accordingly, in presenting an originalist critique of Curtiss-Wright,
this Article attacks the opinion on its own terms-that is, whether
it is indeed a correct interpretation of the understanding of the
constitutional generation.
To begin the inquiry, it is appropriate to sketch the theory of
extraconstitutionality set forth in Curtiss-Wright. Prior to the
Declaration of Independence, sovereign power over the colonies of
course lay with the British government. Sutherland's first claim in
Curtiss-Wrightrelates to what happened at the moment of independence. Upon independence, he said, the power of sovereignty
divided: "internal sovereignty"-control over domestic matterspassed to the states; "external sovereignty"-that is, foreign affairs
power-passed to the unified entity "the United States."' In
Sutherland's view:
As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colonies,
acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from
the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in
their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of
America.... Sovereignty is never held in suspense. When,
32. See id. at 317-20.
33. See id. at 317-18 (discussing the understanding of the Constitutional Convention).
34. Id. at 315-18.
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therefore, the external sovereignty of Great Britain in respect
of the colonies ceased, it immediately passed to the Union.35
Sutherland next claimed that this power of "external sovereignty"
passed from the initial, pre-Articles Union to the confederated
government under the Articles of Confederation: "[Ilt is clear
that the Union, declared by the Articles of Confederation to be
36
'perpetual,' was the sole possessor of external sovereignty."
Although Sutherland did not directly say so, here he must have
meant that the confederation government had those powers
inherently-that is, without reference to the actual grants of power
contained in the Articles.
Sutherland's third claim is the most important. "The Framers
Convention," he asserted, "was called and exerted its powers upon
the irrefutable postulate that though the states were several their
people in respect of foreign affairs were one."3 1 This follows from the
constitutional generation's understanding of the prior assertions:
foreign affairs powerwas an inherent aspect ofnational sovereignty
automatically located in the national government, which had never
been and could never be held by the states." The Constitution's
theory of delegated powers, in this view, simply did not apply (and
logically could not apply) to foreign affairs. The states could not
delegate what they never possessed. As Sutherland put it:
[T]he primary purpose ofthe Constitution was to carve fromthe
general mass of legislative powers then possessed by the states
such portions as it was thought desirable to vest in the federal
government, leavingthose not included in the enumeration still
in the states. That this doctrine applies only to powers which
the states had is self-evident. And since the states severally
never possessed international powers, such powers could not
have been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously
were transmitted to the United States from some other source. 39

35. Id. at 316-17.
36. Id at 317.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 316-17.

39. Id. at 316 (citing Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 294 (1936)).
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As a result, when the framers of the Constitution said that the
national government had only the powers given to it by the states,
that statement was subject to an important caveat: it did not
apply to foreign affairs power. The national government already
had those powers, as a natural attribute of its status as a national
government, inherited from Britain by way of the initial informal
Union that followed independence and the formal Union under the
Articles of Confederation; and in any event, these powers could not
be granted to the national government by the states because the
states never had them.
Sutherland's historical discussion focused upon the first point,
that is, that the initial Union after independence was the sole
repository of external sovereignty. He pointed to the language of the
Declaration and the 1783 peace treaty with Britain, executed on
behalf of the Union, as evidence that states did not exercise
"external" power except through the Union, and more generally
referred to the practice during this early period as confirmation
that the united government, and not the states, acted in
international matters.40 As to subsequent periods, he simply
asserted that the "external sovereignty" that he believed he had
found in the Continental Congress passed to Congress under the
Articles of Confederation and to the national government under the
Constitution.4
B. The Debate over Curtiss-Wright
The principal attacks upon Sutherland's theoryhave also focused
on the period immediately following independence, asserting that
states did exercise power in international matters at this time and
that responsibilities in that field were understood to be shared
between the states and the national government.4 2 In this manner,
much of the leading academic discussion of Curtiss-Wrighthas been
drawn into difficult historical and metaphysical questions about the
40. See id. at 316-17 (discussingthe Declaration, the peace treaty, and practice under the
Continental Congress).

41. See id. at 317.
42. See, e.g., Levitan,supra note 6, at 478-90; Patterson, supranote 6, at 297-308, 445-52.
Similarly, Curtiss-Wright'sacademic defenders focus on the early period. See Morris, supra
note 7, at 1068-88 (primarily discussing events from 1774 to 1780).
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nature of sovereignty. By focusing on the early period, the debate
becomes inseparable from one of the most fundamental and
intractable debates of federalism: as historian43 Jack Rakove puts it,
"Which came first, the Union or the states?"

To Curtiss-Wright's detractors, at independence the states
individually became sovereign and thereafter formed a Union by
delegation from complete sovereignty.' Some activities of the
states (and the statements of some leaders) support this view, and
plainly this chronology, if correct, is at odds with Sutherland's
theory. If the states created the Union from a position of complete
sovereignty, the national government could not "inherit" foreign
affairs power directly from Britain. But the early history is
ambiguous. Historian Richard Morris, in a careful account of the
period before and after independence, has argued that"[tihe federal
Union not only preceded the States in time, but initiated their
formation.' Accordingly, he concluded, Sutherland's "historical
analysis of the inherent foreign affairs powers of the national
government would not have seemed alien to the thinking of many,
if not all, of the Founding Fathers."46 And Professor Rakove,
another leading modern historian of the period, concludes that
Morris has the better of the argument.47 In the words of a third
prominent historian, "[tihe authority of the Continental Congress
and the Continental Army was in fact so great during the critical
years of Independence and the war as to provoke a continuing if
fruitless debate... over the priority of the Union or the states." 8
43. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: PoLMCS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTrUTION 163 (1996); see also RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 21
(1987) ("Nation or Sovereign States: Which Came First?"); Patterson, supranote 6, at445 ("Is

the Union Older than the States?").
44. As Professor Rakove summarizes, the view was that "the separation from Britain had

'placed the 13 States in a state of nature towards each other,' and that only then had these
'separate sovereignties' formed a federal government for the dual purpose of'defend[ing] the
whole agst. foreign nations' and the lesser States agst. the ambition of the larger. RAKOVE,
supra note 43, at 163 (describing and quoting Luther Martin's statements to the
Constitutional Convention); see also 1RECORDSOFTHEFEDERALCONVENTIONOF 1787, at 166

(Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafterFARRAND, RECORDS] (recordingMartin's argument). For
historical accounts endorsing Martin's chronology, see BERGER, supra note 43, at 21-47;
Lofgren, supra note 6, at 12-20; Patterson, supra note 6, at 445-56.
45. Morris, supra note 7, at 1057.

46. Id at 1061-62.
47. See RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 173-74 n.*.

48. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERiCAN REPuBLIc 1776-1787, at 355
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This difficult and perhaps unanswerable question of precedence

is compounded because quite early on it became the subject of
partisan debate in the service of a distinct and far-reaching
whether the states had inherent rights as
matter-the question
"sovereigns.' 9 In the view of states' rights proponents, "the idea
that the states preceded and created the Union proved that they

retained certain inherent powers that the Union could never
supersede. "5 ° This view arose as early as the debates in the
Constitutional Convention, and was opposed energetically by

nationalists such as Hamilton and Wilson, who sought to create a
strong national government in the drafting of the Constitution.5
The debate periodically recurred with vehemence: during the crisis
preceding the Civil War, for example, southern states asserted a
right to secede based on their inherent sovereignty, a matter

Lincoln disputed by arguing that the states had never been fully
sovereign." In short, views of the precedence of the states or the
Union tended, from the beginning, to be shaped by views of
inherent state rights and immunities

against

the federal

(1998). As Professor Wood further observes: "Mhe Continental Congress since 1774
exercised an extraordinary degree of political, military, and economic power over the
colonists-adopting commercial codes, establishing and maintaining an army, issuing a
continental currency, erecting a military code of law, defining crimes against the Union, and
negotiating abroad." Id.; see also id. at 356-59 (indicating the difficulty of a clear resolution
of the matter, given the Revolutionaries' own unsettled view ofsovereigntyin the 1770s and
1780s).
49. See BERGER, supra note 43, at 21 ("Whether the States were independent
sovereignties before the adoption of the Constitution... is fundamental to States' Rights
claims ....
").
50. RAKoVE,supra note 43, at 163. See the exchange between Luther Martin and James
Wilson at the Constitutional Convention, recounted in id. at 163 and in 1 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 44, at 166. See also the similar statement of Rufus King in the
Constitutional Convention, quoted in UnitedStates v. Curtiss-WrightExportCorp., 299 U.S.
304, 317 (1936). On the political implications and motivations for this debate, see RAKOVE,
supra note 43, at 161-202.
51. See RAKOVE, supra note 43, at 163.
52. See generally Amar, supra note 15 (discussing the historical debate). Lincoln, for
example, argued in terms reminiscent of Curtiss-Wright:"The original [states] passed into
the Union even before they cast off their British colonial dependence .... The Union is older
than any of the States, and, in fact, it created them as States." Id at 1460 n.153 (quoting
Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress, July 4, 1861); see also JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES 138-39 (1833) (concluding that

states lacked complete sovereignty); Morris, supranote 7, at 1063-67 (tracing this debate
from the founding through the nineteenth century).
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government-a question tangential at best to the issue in CurtissWright, and one upon which consensus has proved impossible to
achieve.5" As a result of the scope and ambiguity of the issues with
which the Curtiss-Wright theory has become enmeshed, its
detractors have not been able to make an impermeable case.'
Focus upon the initial period of independence, and attempts to
develop a comprehensive account of the relationship between
state and federal sovereignties, miss the central vulnerability of
Curtiss-Wright'sclaim. Curtiss-Wrightcan be conclusively rejected
without accepting the broader claims of state sovereignty. The
immediate question is not how external sovereignty was distributed
in the initial government after the Revolution, but how it was
distributed under the Constitution; the question is not whether the
state or federal governments in general have inherent powers
and immunities by virtue of "sovereignty" (however defined), but
whether foreign affairs powers are inherent in the federal government or derivative of the Constitution.
The critical question, at the appropriate level of generality, is
what happened with respect to foreign affairs powers in 1787-89.
Curtiss-Wright depends upon a showing that the constitutional
generation in 1787-89 understood the national government to
have inherent extraconstitutional powers in foreign affairs. The
53. See BERGER, supra note 43, at 21 n.1 (collecting authorities on both sides of the
debate); Morris, supranote 7, at 1066-67 & 1067 n.71 (same). Arelated controversy concerns
the scope of the states' reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment. In one account, the
Tenth Amendment is comprehensive, stating, as it seems to on its face, that all powers not
delegated to the federal government remain with the states or the people. See U.S. CONST.
amend. X. On the other hand, a more limited view holds that the Tenth Amendment applies
only to matters actually encompassed by original state sovereignty. Again, the issue is an old
one. Joseph Story argued in 1833 that the idea of federal power as purely delegated power
is incomplete: 'the states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out
of the existence of the national government, which the constitution does not delegate to
them.... No state can say, that it has reserved, what it never possessed." 1 STORY, supra
note 52, § 627. For a modem version of this debate, compare U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 801-05 (1995) (Stevens, J.) (adopting Story's view and holding that
states inherentlylack power to impose term limits in congressional elections) with idi at 84556 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (adopting a comprehensive view of the Tenth Amendment and
arguing that power to impose term limits in congressional elections is a power reserved to
the states).
54. See HENKIN, supranote 2, at 19-20 (assessing the debate); see also Morris, supranote
7, at 1060-68 (adopting Sutherland's view of the initial period of independence despite
academic criticism of Curtiss-Wright).
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historical inquiry is whether this is true. This question is

answerable without addressing the "which came first" debate or
taking a position on the larger issues of federalism. 55
Rather than seeking a solution to abstract questions of
sovereignty, the matter can be approached as a straightforward
question of constitutional interpretation. Using constitutional text,
as interpreted in light of the structure of the document and its
history and context, we can inquire whether the Constitution is best
understood as a document that contemplates extraconstitutional
power in foreign affairs. If the Constitution was adopted upon this
understanding, then Sutherland's specific conclusions with respect
to foreign affairs powers have a strong basis, whatever the
appropriate view of the chronological priority of the states and the
national government. Conversely, if the Constitution was adopted
upon the understanding that foreign affairs powers were, like other
powers, granted to the federal government by that document,
Sutherland's view has little to recommend it regardless of the early
history of state sovereignty.
Once the question is framed in this manner, it is impossible to
defend Curtiss-Wright's conclusion. As set forth below, the
Constitution itself heavily implies that there was no conception of
inherent foreign affairs power, for otherwise much of its text would
be largely irrelevant. The framers and ratifiers of the Constitution
repeatedly emphasized that the foreign affairs powers of the
national government were those delegated in the Constitution.
Moreover, the evidence of the Articles of Confederation is decisive
against the idea of inherent foreign affairs powers. Like the
Constitution, the Articles contained specific grants of foreign affairs
powers to the federal government, although these grants were
somewhat more limited than those contained in the Constitution.
While the Articles were in force, everyone thought that foreign
affairs powers not granted to the national government in the
55. Similarly, the narrow focus on foreign affairs proposed here does not address whether
the federal government has any inherent powers, such as, for example, power over Indian
tribes. Compare Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its Discontents: Coherence and
Conciliationin FederalIndianLaw, 110 HARv. L. REV. 1754, 1760-61 (1997) (arguing that
federal government's power in tribal affairs is inherent), with Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal
Protectionand the Special Relationship:The Case of Native Hawaiians,106 YALE L.J. 537,
542-48 (1996) (arguing that federal power in tribal affairs derives from airmative grants of
power in the Constitution).
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Articles themselves were not possessed by the national government.
One of the leading motivators for the Constitutional Convention of
1787 was the desire to give the national government additional
foreign affairs powers omitted from the Articles. In short, no
evidence supports Sutherland's specific view, and there is
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE AGAINST CURTISS-WRIGHT
This section examines the Constitution itself for evidence of an
understanding of the source of foreign affairs powers. For purposes
of this study we may assume that the "nationalist" account of the
early years of independence is correct-that is, that the national
government emerged prior to (or at least simultaneously with) the
states, and that the national government, and not the states,
primarily exercised foreign affairs power during this time. Even if
this is correct, as discussed below there is little to indicate that the
drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution thought that foreign
affairs represented a special extraconstitutional category ofpowers.
Rather, foreign affairs powers were allocated in the document and
discussed in leading publications and debates in the same tenor as
internal matters-namely, upon the understanding that their
allocation and exercise arose from the plan of government
established by the Constitution.
A Affirmative Grants of ForeignAffairs Power
The Constitution does not read like a document drafted by or for
those who believed in inherent foreign affairs powers. Many of its
provisions are grants of specific foreign affairs powers to some part
of the national government. By Article I, Section 8, Congress has
the power to regulate foreign commerce; to declare war; to grant
letters of marque; to regulate with respect to piracies, felonies on
the high seas and the law of nations; and to regulate the Army and
Navy. 6 By Article H, Sections 2 and 3, the President has the power
to receive ambassadors and to command the military, and the
President-plus-Senate have the power to make treaties and appoint
56. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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ambassadors. 7 The text contains at least ten separate references to
particular core foreign affairs powers.
One might respond that the point of these clauses is not to
grant foreign affairs powers to the national government (as the
government already had these powers inherently), but to allocate
these powers within the branches of the national government.5"
Thus, on Curtiss-Wright's theory the declare-war clause is not
superfluous, for even though the national government already had
that power it would not be clear, absent the clause, whether
Congress or the President had it.
The framers themselves, however, explained these clauses
differently. In The Federalist,numbers 41 to 46, Madison presented
a comprehensive overview of the powers of the national government. Federalist 41, the beginning of this series, is entitled
"General View of the Powers Proposedto be Vested in the Union.""
It begins:
The Constitution proposed by the convention maybe considered
under two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum
or quantity of power which it vests in the government.... The
SECOND, to the particular structure ofthe government and the
distribution of this power among its several branches.
Under the first view of the subject, two important questions
arise: 1. Whether any part of the powers transferredto the
general government be unnecessary or improper? a. Whether
the entire mass of them [i.e., of the powers transferred to the
general government] be dangerous to the portion ofjurisdiction
left in the several States 0
Plainly, by this language Madison is proposing to discuss powers
granted to the national government by the Constitution.
Madison then divides these powers into six categories of powers
"conferredon the government of the Union," of which the first two
are foreign affairs powers: "Security against foreign danger" and
57. See id. art. II, § 2, 3.

58. See HENIEN, supra note 2, at 19 (suggesting this argument).
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 266 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(emphasis added).
60. Id. (emphasis added).
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"[regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations."61 The balance
of Federalist 41 is a defense of the granting of the powers in the
first category, including war, letters of marque, and providing
armies and fleets. The claim is that the federal government would
be too weak without these powers, and so it is appropriate for the
Constitution to grant them. Madison asks rhetorically, for example,
"was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising
TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in
PEACE as well as in WAR?" 2 His answer: it would not have been
"prudent" to "chain the discretion" of the national government by
failing to grant such powers.63
Federalist 42, the succeeding number, takes up the second class1
of powers-that is, the powers of intercourse with foreign nations.
Again, Madison describes these as powers "lodged in the general
government" by the Constitution.65 Under this heading he discusses
additional foreign affairs powers: treaties, ambassadors, regulation
of foreign commerce, and punishment of piracy, crimes on the high
seas and violations of the law of nations.' Again, the background
assumption is that if these powers were not granted in the
Constitution, the national government would not have them. For
example, Madison says the following with respect to "other public
ministers and consuls":
[A] power of appointing and receiving 'other public ministers
and consuls' is expressly and very properly added to the former
provision [of the Articles of Confederation] concerning
ambassadors. The term ambassador ..

. comprehends the

highest grade only of public ministers, and excludes the grades
which the United States will be most likely to prefer.... IThe
mission of American consuls into foreign countries mayperhaps
be covered under the authority, given by the ninth article of the
Confederation, to appoint all such civil officers as may be
necessary for managingthe general affairs of the United States.
But the admission of consuls into the United States, where no
61. Id. at 266-67 (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 267.

63. Id.
64. See THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
65. Id. at 273.

66. See id.

398

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:379

previous treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere
provided for. A supply of the omission is one of the lesser
instances in which the convention have improved on the model
before them. 7
In similar vein, Madison commends the new Constitution for
granting to Congress the power to punish piracies and offenses on
the high seas and against the law of nations as a "still greater
improvement on the Articles of Confederation. These articles
contain no provision for the case of offenses against the law of
nations; and consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet
member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations." 8 And
further, speaking of the very power at issue in Curtiss-Wright,he
says that "[tihe regulation of foreign commerce... has been too
fully discussed to need additional proofs here of its being properly
submitted to the federal administration."69 In conclusion, Madison
asserts that he has shown "that no one of the powers transferredto
the federalgovernment is unnecessary or improper .... 70
All of this is, of course, nonsense if the federal government has
inherent foreign affairs power and the constitutional clauses are
meant only to allocate that power between the President and
Congress. All of Madison's statements assume exactly the
opposite-that absent a grant of a foreign affairs power, the power
does not exist in the national government. According to Madison,
the powers of war, fleets and armies are appropriately included in
the Constitution, else the federal government would lack the ability
to defend the nation.7 1 The drafters show commendable attention to
detail, he says, in including a provision for sending and receiving
consuls, for otherwise the government would lack the power to send
and receive them.7 2 In his view, without the Constitution's grant of
power to punish offenses against the law of nations the federal
government would have to leave that to the states, and it is
obviously appropriate to "submit to" the federal government the
67. Id. at 273-74.
68. 1I at 274.

69. Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
70. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)

(emphasis added).
71. See THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 267 (James Madison) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987).
72. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 273-74 (James Madison) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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power to regulate foreign commerce.7" Yet surely these powers
would be included in Curtiss-Wrights definition of "external
sovereignty." One can only conclude that Madison thought his
audience had no concept of inherent extraconstitutional foreign
affairs power.
The same is true of Hamilton. In Federalist 23 he argues:
Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with
the care of the common defense is a question in the first
instance open to discussion; but the moment it is decided in the
affirmative, it will follow that that government ought to be
clothed
with all the powers requisiteto complete execution of its
74
trust.
In Federalist 24, Hamilton discusses "the powers proposed to be
conferred upon the federal government, in respect to the creation
and direction of the national forces...."7 His argument tracks
Madison's in Federalist 41: it is appropriate for the Constitutionto
give the national government the powers of national defense, rather
than leaving them to the states." Again, this makes no sense if the
national government had inherent foreign affairs powers, which
would surely include the power of national defense.
The affirmative grants ofvarious foreign affairs powers contained
in the Constitution, coupled with the insistence of the
Constitution's defenders that these clauses were necessary to vest
the national government with foreign affairs powers, argue strongly
against an idea that those powers might be extraconstitutional.
That might be undercut b&a showing of a contrary line of thinking
holding these phrases to be relevant only to the distribution of
powers already held by the national government. However, that
idea is not discernable in surviving discussions of foreign affairs
powers among the constitutional generation. Hamilton and Madison
may be taken as indicators of a conventional understanding of
foreign affairs powers-that the federal government depended on the
73. See supranote 69 and accompanying text.
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 185 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(emphasis added).

75. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 188 (Alexander Hamilton) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(emphasis added).
76. See THEFEDERALISTNOS. 23,24,25 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 41 (James Madison).
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text of the Constitution for these powers. As both Hamilton and
Madison described it, the foreign affairs powers in the Constitution
represent powers "transferred to" or "conferred upon" the national
government by the Constitution; were they not granted in the
Constitution, they would adhere in the states and not in the
national government. That is flatly inconsistent with the CurtissWright theory.
B. Specific Denialsof ForeignRelationsPower to the States
In addition to affirmative grants of foreign affairs power to the
national government, the Constitution contains prohibitions upon
the exercise of specific foreign affairs powers by the states. States
are prohibited from entering into treaties or granting letters of
marque; states are prohibited, without the consent of Congress,
from taxing imports and exports, keeping troops or ships of war in
peacetime, entering into agreements with foreign powers, or
engaging in war unless invaded. These provisions make up much of
three long clauses of Article I, Section 10.78
The presence of clauses denying important foreign affairs powers
to the states further undermines the idea that the framers thought
the national government had inherent and exclusive powers in
foreign affairs. If the states were extraconstitutionally precluded
from engaging in foreign affairs, what was the point of these
clauses? Curtiss-Wright demands that all of this language be
dismissed as surplusage.
The counterargument must be that these clauses were indeed
superfluous and intended as insurance. Even if the drafters
believed that states lacked foreign affairs powers inherently,
perhaps they thought state exercise of such powers would be so
dangerous that they should make doubly sure by including in the
text specific prohibitions of the worst practices. These clauses had
no immediate operative purpose, the argument runs, but ensure
that even if the idea of inherent exclusive external sovereignty was

77. See THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 188 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 45, at 292 (James
Madison) (Issac Kramnick ed., 1987).
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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later abandoned or forgotten states still could not claim foreign
affairs powers.
As an initial matter, this does not seem the most natural reading
of the text. Had the drafters sought to declare a preexisting
limitation, the more natural phrasing would have been to begin
with a general statement-that states are precluded from foreign
affairs-and then include specific examples of the powers denied to
the states. Including clauses merely declaratory of preexisting
specific limitations on state governments, without such a general
statement, would risk implying that such a list in fact contained all
of the preexisting limitations.7 9 Because including the specific
restrictions would undercut a general restriction, anyone who
believed in the general restriction should have hesitated to include
the specifics, at least without a further explanatory statement. Yet
there is no record of anyone objecting to Article I, Section 10 on
these grounds. That is further suggestive because the Framers were
concerned about precisely this problem in other contexts. It is
familiar history, for example, that one of the chief objections raised
against the Constitution was its lack of a Bill of Rights, and that
one of the chief responses was that one could not hope to name all
of an individual's rights in a single list, and the inclusion of some
rights would imply the nonexistence of others."0 Yet surely the same
danger was posed by Article I, Section 10, were it merely
declaratory: the states would claim that foreign affairs powers not
listed were impliedly retained by the states. 8 No one commented
upon this problem, further suggesting that there was no common
understanding of an inherent exclusion of the states from foreign
affairs.
A further objection to the "declaratory" reading is the structure
of Article I, Section 10, which includes in the s.me clause both

79. For further elaboration of this point, see Ramsey, supra note 21, at 411-12.
80. See RAKOVE,supra note 43, at 288-338 (discussingthe debate over the Bill of Rights).
It was this concern that gave rise to the Ninth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; 1
ANNAIS OF CONG. 441 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (statement of James Madison) (describing
purpose of Ninth Amendment).
81. See also THE FEDERALiST NO. 32, at 221-22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987) (employing similar reasoning to argue that, since states were denied the specific
power of taxing imports and exports by Article I, Section 10, they must have the general
power of taxation of other items not specifically mentioned).
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external and internal powers denied to the states. The first
sentence, for example, reads:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation;
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin money, emit Bills of
Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law,
the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title
or Law impairing
82
of Nobility.
By the Curtiss-Wright theory, the first two of these powers are
inherent and exclusive prerogatives of the national government not
within the power of the states even absent a constitutional
prohibition. But most of the remaining powers were widely
exercised by the states after 1776, and although often opposed on
moral and practical grounds, they were not thought beyond the
states' sovereign powers. No one doubted, for example, that the
states had the power to print paper money (and would continue to
have it unless precluded by the Constitution).' It seems
structurally sound, given the equivalent status oftreatymaking and
printing paper money in Article I, Section 10, to treat them as
equivalent powers-that is, things that states might otherwise do,
but in the name of good government should be precluded from
doing.
Moreover, as with the affirmative grants, the drafters explained
their prohibitions of state foreign affairs powers as operative rather
than declaratory. Madison, summarizing Article I, Section 10, says
"Afifth class of provisions in favor of the federal authority consists
82. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §10.
83. For state acts creating paper money, see for example, 5 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE

PROVINCE OF MASSACHUsETTS BAY, 1769-1780, at 442 (1886) (3rd Session, November 1775);

5

id. at 1178 (3rd Session 1780); 10 WILLiAm WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE:

BEINGA COLLECTION OFALLOFTHE LAWS OFVIRGINIA 241-42 (1823) (May Session, 1780); 10
id. at 430-31 (May Session 1781); 9 JAMES T. MITCHELL & HENRY FLANDERS, STATUTES AT
LARGEOFPENNSYLVANIAFROM 1682T 1801(1903), at 34-35 (Aug. 1,1776) thereinafter LAws
OF PENNSYLVANIA]; 10 id. at 183 (Mar. 25, 1780). On the controversies surrounding paper
money in particular states, see for example, John P. Kaminski, Rhode Island.Protecting

State Interests, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 370-75 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael
Lienesch eds., 1989) (discussingpaper money in Rhode Island);'SaraML Shumer,New Jersey:
Propertyand the Priceof Republican Politics,in id. at 71, 79-80 (discussing paper money in
New Jersey).
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ofthe following restrictions on the authority ofthe several States.""4
Madison apparently saw Article I, Section 10 as an operative
provision that created a "restriction" upon "the authority" the states
would otherwise have, rather than a provision declaring a
preexisting lack of power on the part of the states. Also, in
defending these restrictions on the states he does not say that they
were simply declarative of preexisting inherent restrictions. That
would have been the easiest defense, had it been widely accepted.
Instead, Madison gives policy reasons for the restrictions, implying
that absent the restrictions, the evils of state involvement in these
aspects of foreign affairs would likely occur.85 Further, Madison
discusses the foreign affairs restrictions on the same terms, and in
the same number of The Federalist, as other constitutional
restrictions on the states that were assuredly not merely
declaratory of inherent limitations on state sovereignty, such as the
limitations on printing paper money or interfering with the
obligation of contracts.8 6
As a result, the specific limitations on the states further show an
understanding that foreign affairs powers were not extraconstitutional, but had to be granted to the national government and
denied to the states in the same manner as any other sort of power.
True, the text and commentary show that in general the Framers
thought that foreign affairs powers were more appropriately
exercised by the national government - but they also show that the
Framers thought this was a structural choice that needed to be
reflected in the nation's governing document, rather than one that
arose automatically from some abstract theory of sovereignty.
I. THE PRECEDENT OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

The most significant precedent for the Constitution in matters
of foreign affairs was the Articles of Confederation, the nation's
governing document from 1781 until 1789. Many of the
Constitution's provisions respecting foreign affairs were copied from
the Articles, either directly or with minor changes. Moreover, in
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 44 at 286 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(emphasis added).
85. See id.
86. See id.
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explaining the Constitution, its drafters often referred to the
Articles to justify particular foreign affairs provisions.
An examination of the Articles' theory of foreign affairs power is
therefore important to an understanding of the Constitution's
theory. This is true in several respects. First, in the Curtiss-Wright
view, the Articles, like the Constitution and the pre-Articles Union,
were based upon a theory of external sovereignty inherently
held by the national government. According to Sutherland, that
sovereignty--containing the foreign affairs power-passed automatically and without interruption from the British monarchy to
the Union, to the government under the Articles, and finally to the
government under the Constitution.8 7 Second, it may be conceivable
as a theoretical matter that the Constitution adopted a theory of
inherent foreign affairs powers even if the Articles did not; however,
the historical context makes this unlikely. The framers of the
Constitution saw the Articles as a model; although they saw many
areas that needed reform, they also repeatedly emphasized that
many of the features of the Constitution were simply carried over
from the Articles, particularly in foreign affairs.8 8 It seems highly
unlikely that they started from a radically different view of the
sources of foreign affairs power than existed under the Articles.
A. Text of the Articles of Confederation
The text of the Articles of Confederation, like the text of the
Constitution, does not appear on its face to contemplate inherent
foreign affairs power. First, the Articles, like the Constitution,
explicitly grant key foreign affairs powers to the confederation
government, including the powers of war and treatymaking 9 As
87. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936).
88. See infra Part III.D.
89. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND PERPETUAL UNION BETWEEN THE STATES OF
NEW HAMPSHIRE, MASSACHUSErI' BAY, RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS,
CONNECTICUT, NEW YOPx NEW JERSEY, PENNSYLVANL, DELAWARE, MARYLAND, VIRGINIA,
NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA AND GEORGIA art. IX, reprintedin JAMES BAYARD, A
BRIEF EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 171 (1845) [hereinafter
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION] (declaring that the "United States, in Congress assembled,
shall have the sole and exclusive right and power" of, among other matters, war and peace,
sending and receiving ambassadors, entering into treaties, establishing prize rules, and
granting letters of marque and reprisal in peacetime).
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with the Constitution, this suggests that there was no idea of
inherent foreign relations power-else why grant these powers in
specific terms? Moreover, the rejoinder to this argument under the
Constitution-that specification was necessary to show which
branch of the federal government had the particular power in
question-is unavailable with respect to the Articles. Under the
Articles, there was only a single branch of government, the
Continental Congress.9" The only reason for an affirmative grant of
power in the Articles, aside from mere redundancy, was that
otherwise the power would not be possessed by the confederation
government.9 1 Second, the Articles, like the Constitution, had
specific limitations upon state activity in foreign affairs.9 2 As under
the Constitution, these limitations were understood as restrictions
upon power that the states would have had absent the restriction.
Madison observed, "[the state] constitutions invest the State
legislatures with absolute sovereignty in all cases not excepted by
the existing Articles of Confederation." Third, the Articles, unlike
the Constitution, explicitly limited the Confederation's power to
matters specifically delegated to it in the document: according to
Article 11, "Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right which is not
by this confederation, expressly delegated to the United States, in
Congress assembled." 4
90. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. V.
91. In this regard, see Madison's comment that because the Articles did not give the
Confederation government the power to send and receive consuls and other lesser ministers,
the Confederation lacked that power. See Madison, supra note 64, at 273.
92. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI (restricting states, without the consent of
Congress, from among other things, sending or receiving foreign embassies, entering into
treaties or agreements, imposing a limited class of duties on foreign goods, maintaining an
army or navy in time of peace, engaging in war, or granting letters of marque and reprisal
in peacetime); id. art. IX (declaring that congressional power over various foreign relations
activities is "sole and exclusive").

93. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 291 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). Two
further provisions of the Articles imply acceptance of a state role in matters affecting foreign

affairs. UnderArticle VI, states could not charge imposts or duties "which may interfere with
any stipulations in treaties." Under Article IX, Congress could not enter into commercial
treaties requiring states to impose lower duties on foreigners than upon their own citizens,

or preventing states from "prohibiting the exportation or importation ofany species of goods
or commodities whatsoever." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. VI, IX
94. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II. On the drafting history of this provision, see

RAKOVE, supranote 7, at 169-74.
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In sum, the text of the Articles, standing alone, seems to reject
the idea of inherent foreign affairs powers. One would have to view
its foreign affairs provisions, particularly those granting war and
treatymaking power to the Confederation, as surplusage, and
dismiss Article II as inapplicable to foreign affairs. The textual
argument is not entirely decisive, however. As discussed, I assume
in this study that the Continental Congress prior to the Articles
exercised a form of inherent foreign affairs power (at least in the
sense of uncontroversially exercising foreign affairs power without
clear documentary authorization), and that the historical record is
at least ambiguous as to whether the states ever had full
sovereignty in some external matters.95 Under this view, the
Articles may have been drafted against a background of assumed
inherent power in foreign affairs. Additionally, although in general
the Continental Congress, and not the states, exercised war and
treatymaking powers during the revolutionary period, there were
controversial exceptions where particular states appeared to claim
a role in these matters.9" Perhaps it is not absurd to suggest,
therefore, that the references to foreign affairs power in the Articles
were indeed merely declaratory of a preexisting inherent arrangement, generally agreed upon but occasionally violated (and so
making an explicit statement appropriate). Moreover, this would
provide a ground for arguing that Article H in fact does not apply
to foreign affairs. By its terms Article II only confirms existing state
sovereignty-and, by this reasoning, foreign affairs did not make up
part of the states' existing sovereignty.9
95. See Morris, supra note 7, at 1068-88 (taking this position); see also Penhallow v.

Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54, 80-81, 91-95 (1795) (Paterson, J., Iredell, J.) (debating the
authority of the pre-Articles Congress in foreign affairs).
96. See Levitan, supranote 6, at 485-90 (citing examples of external state activity); see
also Claude Van Tyne, Sovereignty in theAmericanRevolution:AnHistoricalStudy, 12 AM.

HIST. REV. 529 (1907) (same).
97. See Morris, supra note 7, at 1063 (expressly reaching this conclusion). This is
evidently not how the author ofArticle 11, Thomas Burke, read his language. See RAKOVE,
supranote 7, at 170 (quoting Burke's private description of Article II as establishing that'all
sovereign power was in the states separately, and that particular acts of it, which should be
expressly enumerated, would be exercised in conjunction, and not otherwise; but that in all
things else each State would exercise all the rights and power of sovereignty"). But Burke's
private reading of Article HI was not necessarily representative. See James Wilson,
Considerationson the Bank of North America (1785), reprinted in 2 JAMES WILSON, THE
WoRKs op JAMES WasON, 824, 829-30 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) (arguing that
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As a result, practice under the Articles is critical to evaluating
the correct understanding. Once the Articles were ratified, the
formal structure of U.S. government changed dramatically. During
the revolutionary period, the Union lacked a governing document,
so the practical distribution of powers was, of necessity, somewhat
ad hoc. Upon ratification of the Articles, the Confederation gainedon paper-a formal charter; the question is whether practitioners
under that charter continued to view the distribution of foreign
affairs powers as influenced by a supertextual inherent arrangement, or whether they thought it governed by the language of the
charter itself.
B. Practiceunder the Articles of Confederation

With respect to foreign affairs powers, it seems clear that as a
matter of practical understanding the distribution of powers under
the Articles of Confederation turned upon the document itself. The
Confederation exercised the foreign affairs powers granted to it in

the document-principally war and treatymaking. 98 The states, for
the most part, did not exercise these powers, and when they did,
they were charged with violating the Articles. 9 More significantly,
Article H applied only to powers held by the states prior to ratification of the Articles).
98. When Congress claimed additional foreign relations powers, it based its claim on
specific provisions of the Articles. The Articles, for example, vested no explicit authority in
Congress to maintain a navy; during the war, Congress claimed this authority as an aspect
of the power over war and peace granted in Article IX. After peace with Britain, the question
arose as to whether Congress could maintain a navy in peacetime. Congress claimed that
power, not on the basis of inherent sovereignty, but upon the proper interpretation of the
document itself-specifically, as a further implication of Article IX. See 25 JOURNALS OFTHE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 723-24 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) (Oct. 23, 1783)
[hereinafter JOURNALS].

99. See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 348, 348-49 (Robert Rutland et al. eds., 1975) (criticizing state activities
as contrary to Article IX of the Articles). Some writers have made much of the fact that the
states did not exercise war and treatymaking powers under the Articles, arguing that this
shows that the states had limited external sovereignty. See, e.g., United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936) (quoting, in support of its inherent powers
theory, a statement made by Rufus King in the Constitutional Convention that the states
lacked war and treatymaking powers under the Articles); see also I STORY, supranote 52, at
§138 (concluding that states lacked full sovereignty due to their exclusion from the powers
ofwar and peace). But a lack of these powers is entirely consistent with the idea that the
distribution of powers flowed only from the Articles themselves, as the Articles had express
provisions on the subject. See Congress's 1782 resolution directing the states not to negotiate
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in areas where the Articles did not grant foreign affairs powers
to the Confederation or deny them to the states, the powers in
question were exercised by the states and not by the Confederation.
Many of these omissions proved to be serious defects as the Articles
were put into practice. But the proposed remedy always was to
amend the Articles to add the missing powers, and energetic
(though unsuccessful) campaigns were launched to this effect. The
argument was not that the Confederation could exercise the
missing powers inherently; the common thought was that exercise
of these powers depended upon adding to the textual grants.
When this proved impossible because of the Articles' requirement
of unanimity for amendment,"°° the ultimate remedy was the
Constitutional Convention, called in significant part to give the
national government additional foreign affairs powers. Finally, in
pursuit of that goal, the drafters of the Constitution produced a
document that did contain specific grants to the national government of the foreign relations powers sought unsuccessfully during
the mid-1780s. 101
The foregoing general observations are illustrated by three
specific topics: foreign commerce, enforcement ofthe law of nations,
and enforcement of treaties. Each of these seems to be a core
foreign relations power. Under the Articles, none of these powers
was specifically denied to the states nor granted to the
Confederation. One would think that under a theory of inherent
foreign affairs powers these would nonetheless inhere in the entity
with "external sovereignty" and be denied to entities lacking
"external sovereignty." However, under the Articles the states
exercised power in each of these areas, and the confederation
government was thought to lack the powers not textually granted
to it. In moving to the constitutional government, it was understood
that these defects would be remedied by the specific languageof the
Constitution, granting federal powers under Articles I, H, and VI,
and denying state powers under Article I, Section 10.
a separate peace with Britain, and Virginia's resolution accepting Congress's direction, based
on the fact that "by the articlesof confederation andperpetual union the sole and exclusive

right of making peace is vested in the United States in congress assembled...." 11 HENING,
supra note 83, at 546 (Resolution of May 24, 1782) (emphasis added).
100. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII.

101. See U.S. CONST. art. I §§ 8, 10, art. II §§ 2, 3.
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1. Foreign Commerce
From 1781 through 1788, while the Articles were the governing
document of the United States, the reality was quite simply that
the states taxed and regulated foreign commerce and the
confederation government did not. This system proved unworkable
in several respects, producing persistent calls for reform, and
ultimately leading in part to the Constitutional Convention of 1787.
The common understanding of the problem was that the Articles of
Confederation did not grant the Confederation power over foreign
commerce, and the Convention sought to remedy this by including
express grants of power over foreign commerce to the national
government. This course of events, though essentially uncontested,
is radically inconsistent with the theory of extraconstitutional
power expressed in Curtiss-Wright.
a. Imposts
Chronologically the first major foreign affairs issue arising under
the Articles was taxation of foreign commerce. Most states imposed
duties ("imposts" in the language of the day) upon imports (and in
some cases exports), either generally or upon particular items. 102
Relatedly, states imposed "tonnage duties"--so called because they
were based on the weight of the ship taxed-upon ships landing at
their ports. As a general matter state imposts excepted U.S.
products, and so were quite directly a tax upon foreign nations.
Conversely, from the nation's outset there was no national tax on
foreign commerce.
102. See, e.g., 1LAwSANDRESOLVESOFTHECOMMONWEALTHOFMAsACHUSTPS 62(1801)

[hereinafter LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS] (impost duties in Massachusetts); id. at 96 (1783)
(impost); id. at 196 (impost); id. at 245 (impost and tonnage duties); 12 HENING, supranote
83, at 83-84 (1785) (imposing tonnage duties in Virginia); id. at 289 (1786) (impost and
tonnage duties); id. at 412-15 (1787) (impost); 11 id. at 66-71, 112-29 (1782) (impost); id at
299-306 (1783) (impost and tonnage); 10id at 501 (1781) (impost); 9LAWSOFPENNYLVANIA,
supra note 83, at 252 (1780) (imposts in Pennsylvania, excepting U.S. goods); 11 id. at 68
(1782) (impost); id. at 188 (1783) (impost); id. at 262 (1784) (impost); 12 id. at 99 (1785)
(impost and tonnage duties). Although some of these duties went to pay the costs of
administering ports and related facilities, they also served as a source of general revenue.
See, e.g., 12 HENING, supra note 83, at 412 (1787) (describing the impost as a measure "to
provide for the support of civil government").
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This system led to three difficulties. Tariffs were a primary
source of revenue during that period, so under this system the
states (particularly the port states) controlled much of the nation's
revenue potential. Theoretically that should not have been a
problem because the Congress had the power to impose financial
requisitions on the states.' s In practice, states proved delinquent
in paying their obligations to the Confederation, and as a result the
Confederation was chronically short of money, unable to pay its
debts, and unable to attract additional lenders. 4 Second, states
without major ports, such as New Jersey and North Carolina, in
effect paid import duties to the states-New York and Virginia
respectively-where their imports were first landed."' 5 This bred
interstate hostility, as the port states declined to provide compensation and the portless states retaliated as best they could.' Third,
despite various efforts at coordination, collective action among the
states with respect to tariffs proved impracticable. As a result, the
diplomats of the Confederation lacked leverage to negotiate
reciprocal tariff arrangements and other commercial agreements
with foreign powers. 0 '
These difficulties-particularly the first-became apparent
almost immediately. Robert Livingston initially proposed a nationwide five percent duty on imports in early 1781-even before the
Articles officially took effect-to end the national government's
dependence on unreliable state remittances.' 8 Other proposals for
a national impost appeared in 1783 and 1785-86.09 No one thought,
however, that the confederation government had the power to
impose an impost under the Articles as written."0 The campaign for
a national impost throughout the 1780s took the form of proposed
103. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VIII.
104. See RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 275-329.

105. See id. at 341-42. New York, for example, levied an impost on all cargo landed in the
state. New Jersey shippers, lacking a port in their own state, had no choice but to ship goods
through New York and pay the impost. See id.
106. See id. at 341-42. New Jersey, for example, refused to pay the requisition amount
owed to the Confederation government in 1785 to protest New York's state impost. See id.;
Shumer, supra note 83, at 86.
107. See 25 JOURNALS, supranote 98, at 617:20 (Sept. 25, 1783); Madison, supranote 99,
at 349; RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 342-46.
108. See RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 282.
109. See id. at 337-42.
110. See id. at 306.
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amendments to the Articles to grant such a power. Amendments
required unanimity, and although support for the impost was
broad, amendment was blocked at each juncture by opposition from
one or two states-initially Rhode Island and Georgia, then Virginia,
and ultimately New York.1 1' Although Congress repeatedly urged
the states to grant it the power of impost, no11amendment
ever
2
passed, and no national impost was ever levied.
Critically, the debate over the impost was phrased entirely as a
need to grant additional powers to Congress. The original
Livingston proposal, as approved by Congress in 1781, asked the
11 3
states to "vest... in Congress... a power" to levy the impost.
Although the states for the most part approved the impost, they did
so in terms unmistakably reflecting a grant of a power not
previously existing. Pennsylvania, for example, tracked the
language of Congress's request in passing an Act "to vest in the
Congress of the United States a Power to Levy Duties."" 4
Massachusetts and Virginia, where the issue was seriously
contested, attached conditions to authorization." 5 In Rhode Island,
which refused to approve the initial impost proposal, the matter
was opposed as giving too much additional power to Congress.'
Rhode Island's rejection of the impost, along with Georgia's failure
to act and Virginia's withdrawal of its approval in 1782,1 7 defeated
the proposal. Congress did not establish an impost, ascribing its
inability to act to the failure to receive state approval." 8
Subsequent proposals scaled back the extent of the impost power
in an attempt to mollify the dissenting states. Congress approved
111. See id. at 282-342.
112. See id.

113. 21 JOURNALS, supranote 98, at 1199.
114. 10 LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 83, at 296 (Apr. 5, 1781).

115. See 1LAWsOFMASSACHUSETS, supranote 102, at 107 (Oct. 20,1783); RAKOVE,supra
note 7, at 313. Virginia specified that the actions of Congress in imposing the impost could
not be "repugnant to the constitution and laws of this state." 10 HENING, supranote 83, at

410 (1781).
116. See RAKOVE, supranote 7, at 314-17 (describing the debate in Rhode Island). When
Rhode Island appeared unlikelyto assent, Rhode Island congressional delegate David Howell
congratulated his state for preventing an inappropriate expansion of the powers of Congress.

See id.
117. See 11 HENING, supranote 83, at 171 (1782) (resolving that approval of the impost
power would "contraven[e] the spirit of the confederation!).
118. See 24 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 10.
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a new recommendation in 1783, again phrased as a grant of power
("to invest the United States in Congress assembled with a power
of levy... "), but this time limited to twenty-five years' duration
with actual collection to be done by state officers." 9 Again, most
states enacted measures granting the requested power, although
the matter was closely contested in Massachusetts, Virginia, and
Connecticut;1 2 Rhode Island refused to approve until 1785, and
New York imposed a series of conditions such that its approval
amounted to a rejection.' Again, the debate was phrased in terms
of the imperative of granting additionalpowers to Congress: as one
supporter of the impost argued, "Congress must either be vested...
with the Impost . . . or cease to be a Congress of any
Consequence.... " 2 ' Again, the failure of unanimity (this time
occasioned by New York) doomed the plan, no amendment to the
Articles passed, and Congress did not enact an impost. 23 A third
effort was made in 1786, further scaled back so that the proceeds of
the duties would accrue, in the first instance, to the states, but this
proposal was never even approved by the full Congress. 24 In 1787,
the issue became a central point in the proposed revisions of the
Articles that culminated in the Philadelphia Convention where, it
was argued, the new plan of government needed to give Congress
the power to levy imposts.25

119. I& at 257-58.
120. Approval in Massachusetts, for example, has been credited to the personal
intervention ofCongress's superintendent offinance, Robert Morris. See RAKOVE,supra note
7, at 323.
121. See id at 338.
122. Id. at 341 (quoting Samuel Osgood). See also the resolve of the Massachusetts
assembly, noting the course ofstate approvals of the imposts and requesting that the "United
States in Congress assembled... carry [the impost] into effect... so soon as it shall be
acceded to [by the states]." 1 LAWS OF MASSAOHUSETrs, supra note 102, ch. 17 (Feb. 15,
1786). On the critical condition of Confederation finances, see RAKOVE supranote 7, at 275329; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton) (recounting financial difficulties
of the Confederation government).
123. See RAKOVE, supranote 7, at 342.
124. See id. at 371.
125. See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 44, at 18-19 (recording speech of Edmund
Randolph proposing the Virginia plan). Once textdally vested with the power of levying
imposts by Article I, Section 8 of the new Constitution, Congress promptly enacted a national
impost.
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b. CommercialRegulation

As with imposts, the states and not Congress regulated foreign
commerce during the confederation period. This quickly proved
unworkable. As set forth in greater detail below, the issue essentially evolved as follows. Foreign nations, particularly Britain,
France, and Spain, discriminated against U.S. goods and shipping,

seriously impeding U.S. foreign trade. The United States needed a
credible retaliatory threat to convince these nations to adopt a more

accommodating trade regime. It soon became apparent that a
coordinated response could not be developed at the state level. 6
Accordingly, there was widespread agreement that Congress should
regulate at least some aspects of foreign commerce. Because the

Articles did not grant this power, there was also general agreement that amendment was necessary. But because unanimous
agreement of the states could never be achieved on any particular

amendment, nothing was ever accomplished, and no regulation of
foreign trade was imposed at 127
the national level until after the
ratification of the Constitution.

Early state regulations largely concerned local matters, plus
specifically anti-British measures adopted during and after the
revolution. 128 In the mid-1780s, a new generation of regulations

emerged in response to the economic downturn of that period.
Especially in New England, cheap imports and foreign restrictions

on exports were thought to be the source of the commercial
malaise. 2 9 Massachusetts, for example, under the administration
126. See THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing problems of
coordination duringthe confederation period); Madison, supranote 99, at 349 (same); see also
John C. Yoo, Globalismand-the Constitution:Treaties,Non-Self-Execution and the Original
Understanding,99 COLUM. L. REv. 1955,2013-14 (1999). On Massachusetts's failed attempt
at coordination among the states, see infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
127. See FREDERICK W. MARKS, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE

MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 52-95 (1973); RAKOVE, supra note 43, at 342-47.
128. See, e.g., 1 LAWS OFMASSACHUSETTS, supranote 102, atS1 (Mar. 3,1781) (limitation
on British commerce); id. at 196 (July 1,1784) (regulation of export ofvarious comnnodities);
11 HENING, supranote 83, at 101-03 (1782) (law limitingtrade in British goods); id at 136-38
(1782) (same, enacted on recommendation of U.S. Congress); id. at 329-31(1783) (regulation
of foreign shipping); 10 LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 83, at 417 (Apr. 10, 1782)
(limitations on British commerce); id. at 497 (Sept. 20, 1782) (same); 11 id. at 149 (Sept. 20,
1783) (tonnage duties and quarantine).
129. See VANBECKHALL, POLITICSWITHOUTPARTIES: MASSACHUSETTS, 1780-1791, at 122.
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of Governor Bowdoin enacted an array of commercial regulations,
including a ban on imports of certain goods, a ban on exports in
British and other foreign ships, and limits on the places where

foreign ships could unload."' Several other states, some in explicit
coordination with Massachusetts, enacted similar regimes." 1 But,

as with tariffs, no national coordinated action among the states
could be achieved, and as a result little leverage with foreign
powers could be had.1" 2

At the national level, the economic threat of the closed British
and European trading systems was quickly perceived."
Confederation diplomats such as John Adams sought commercial
treaties with Britain and the European powers largely without

success. Adams in particular argued that national action on
navigation and other import restrictions was essential to the U.S.
bargaining position."3 By 1783, Congress was prepared to act. But
as no one thought Congress had the requisite power, the result was
a campaign to amend the Articles. As the congressional committee

with responsibility for the matter reported: "Your Committee
therefore consider it of the highest importance to counteract these
systems [of Britain and France] so injurious to the United States,
which can only be done by delegating a general Power for regulating

its commercial interests."115 Recognizing that a broad delegation
64 (1972); RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 346.
130. See 1 LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 102, at 99, 439 (June 23,1785); HALL,
supra note 129, at 122-64.
131. See 1 LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supranote 102, at 724,726 (July 2,1785) (recording
Governor's message on coordination with New Hampshire legislature); id at 768 (Nov. 14,
1785) (recording Governor's message on coordination with Rhode Island).
132. See generally RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 342-52 (discussing weakness of national
government in addressing foreign commercial threats). On the problems of coordination
among the states, see MARKS, supra note 127, at 82-83. As Professor Marks notes in
describinga failed attempt at regulation of foreign commerce in Virginia, "[tihere was simply
no answer to the argument that whatever goods might be barred from Norfolk and
Alexandria would be admitted to Maryland and North Carolina and smuggled from there into
Virginia. Id. at 83.
133. See 25 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 589 (Sept. 19, 1788) (discussing problems of
British system); RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 345 (same, noting that British restrictions became
an issue as early as the summer of 1783).
134. See 25 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 617-18 (Sept. 25, 1783) (reporting on
communications of John Adams to Continental Congress).
135. Id. at 618 (September 25, 1783); see also id. at 619 (Sept. 26, 1783) (reflecting
comments from U.S. ambassadors amplifying the national government's commercial
difficulties with Europe in the absence of commercial power).
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would be difficult to achieve from the states, the following year
Congress considered more limited proposals for a national

navigation act and for legislation limiting the ability of foreign
nationals to trade in imported goods.13 Even so limited, these took
the form of a request for additional powers. As a further committee
report noted:
It will certainly be admitted, that unless the United States can
act as a nation and be regarded as such by foreign powers, and
unless Congress for this purpose shall be vested with powers
competent to the protection of commerce, they can never
command reciprocal advantages in trade; and without such
reciprocity, our foreign commerce must decline and eventually
be annihilated. 13
Accordingly, the report continued, "it seems necessary that the
States should be explicit, and fix on some particular mode by which
foreign commerce not founded on principles of reciprocity, may be
restrained."' In pursuit of this goal, the committee recommended

and Congress approved two resolutions:
That it be recommended to the Legislatures of the several
States, to vest the United States in Congress assembled, for the
term offifteen years, with power to prohibit any goods, wares or
merchandise from being imported into or exported from any of
the States in vessels belonging to or navigated by the subjects
of any power with whom these States shall not have formed
Treaties of Commerce.... [and]
That it be recommended to the legislatures of the several
States, to vest the United States in Congress assembled, for the
term offifteen years, with the power of prohibiting the subjects
of any foreign state, kingdom or empire... from importing into
the United States, any good wares or merchandize which are
not the produce or manufacture of the Dominions of the
Sovereign or whose subjects they are.1"9

136. See RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 345-46.
137. 26 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 270 (Apr. 22, 1784) (emphasis added).
138. Id
139. Id at 271 (setting forth resolutions); see id. at 321-22 (reflecting final approval of

resolutions).
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In short, Congress sought limited powers-essentially, only to
regulate the activities of certain foreign ships entering or leaving
U.S. waters, and certain trading activities of aliens. Yet this was
thought beyond the existing powers of Congress, and Congress was
sufficiently concerned about its ability to obtain the needed powers
that it further limited the proposed power to fifteen years' duration
and provided that, if granted, no action would be taken pursuant to
these powers without the consent of nine states.1 40 But even with
this proviso, unanimous approval of the states proved unobtainable.
A second proposal, involving broader commercial powers, was made
by committees in 1785 and 1786 but could not even secure the
approval of the full Congress."
As with the impost, the debate over commercial regulations was
framed as a question whether Congress should be given additional
powers. As noted, Congress's resolutions to the states asked that
the state legislatures vest it with additional powers. States that did
approve the new powers phrased their approval as a grant of
additional powers.14 Proponents urged the need for the granting of
additional powers. Massachusetts Governor Bowdoin, for example,
in an address to the state legislature stated:
[Britain and the European powers] have an undoubted right to
regulate their trade with us, and to admit into their ports on
their own terms, the vessels and cargoes that go from the
United States, or to refuse all admittance.... The United
States have the same right, and can and ought to regulate their
foreign trade on the same principles. But it is a misfortune that
the Congress have not yet been authorized for that purpose by
all the States....

140. See id. at 322.
141. See 28 JOURNALS, supranote 98, at 201 (Mar. 28, 1785); see also MARES, supranote
127, at 87-90.
142. See, e.g., 1 LAWS OF MASSACHUSETrS, supra note 102, at 41 (July 1, 1784) (labeling
legislation as "An act vesting certain powers in Congress," resolving that "the United States
in Congress assembled be, and they hereby are vested with full power" to enact specified
regulations of foreign trade); 11 HENING, supra note 83, at 388 (May session, 1784)
(describing act as "[anact to invest the United States in congress assembled, with additional
powers for a limited time," by which Congress "empowered" to prohibit certain foreign
commerce); 11 LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 83, at 391 (Dec. 17, 1784) (describing
legislation as "An act to vest Congress with certain powers for the protection ofcommerce").
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Bowdoin continued:
It is of great importance... that Congress should be vested
with all the powers necessary to preserve the Union, to manage
the general concerns of it, and secure and promote its common
interest. That interest, so far as it is dependent on a commercial
intercourse with foreign nations, the confederation does not
sufficiently provide; and this state, and the United States in
general, are now experiencing by the oppressidn of their trade
with some of these nations, particularly Great Britain, the want
of such provision. This deficiency of power may be the result of
a just principle, a caution to preserve to each state all the
powers not necessary to be delegated; with respect to which, as
there was room for a variety of opinions concerning them, they
could not all be certainly known at the time of forming the
confederation. Experience, however, has shown the necessity of
delegating to Congress further powers ....

'

Similarly, opponents contended that the proposals constituted new
powers that would unduly expand congressional authority.1'
Despite the importance of the issue and the continued frustration
in failing to obtain a relatively modest power most people thought
appropriate, neither Congress nor the regulations' proponents
asserted that Congress had any inherent powers in this regard.
When by 1786 amendment appeared hopeless, Congress simply
abandoned the project, and no commercial regulations were passed
at the national level until after ratification of the Constitution.
The resulting impasse played a substantial role in prompting the
1787 Constitutional Convention. By the mid-1780s, the need for
national power over, at minimum, imposts and navigation was
widely embraced but blocked by a few states-providing general

143. Governor Bowdoin, speech to the Massachusetts Legislature (May 31, 1785),

reprintedin 1 LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 102, at 706.
144. See RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 346-49. For example, Abraham Yates, later a delegate
from New York to the Constitutional Convention, wrote that he was "rather Suspitious that
the advocates for augmenting the powers of Congress will try to Effect their Scheme under
the Cloak of investing Congress with power to make Commercial Regulations." Id. at 347
(quoting letter from Yates to Rhode Island delegate David Howell). George Mason, in
opposing the new proposal, wrote that "Congress should not even have the appearance of

such a power." NORMAN K.RISJORD, CHEsAPEAHE POLITICS 1781-1800, at 253 (1978).
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disenchantment with the unanimity requirements of the Articles.'4 5
Following the failure of the proposed amendments in both areas in
1785, delegates met in Annapolis in 1786 to discuss the need for
reform generally and the desirability of amendments relating to
navigation in particular. Though inconclusive because of poor
attendance, this convention issued the call for a second convention
the following year in Philadelphia-and that convention in turn
specifically addressed the problems with foreign commerce under
the articles by giving Congress power over imposts and foreign
1
commerce. 4
Importantly, the constitutional generation saw the issues
surrounding regulation of foreign commerce, as well as the impost,
as key components of the United States' international influence. It
was not merely a matter of providing Congress with revenue and
keeping out injurious foreign products (although these points were
important as well). It was, more broadly, a matter of foreign policy.
A central point of both the impost and the proposed commercial
regulations was to enhance the U.S. bargaining position with other
nations. That was what Massachusetts Governor Bowdoin sought
through his plan to coordinate regulations at the state level; it was
what diplomats like Adams thought they needed to support their
missions, and it was what supporters of the amendments to the
Articles-and ultimately, supporters of the replacement of the
Articles-sought to convey to the national government.14 ' In short,
both the impost and the commercial regulations fundamentally
were about foreign affairs; the conventional thinking, both then and
now, about the failures of Congress under the Articles, was and is
that it had not been granted enough power in these areas.'
145. See MARKS, supra note 127, at 52-95; RAKOVE, supranote 7, at 369-70.
146. See MARKS, supra note 127, at x (noting that the foreign affairs problems of the
Confederation were of"overwhelming significance" in prompting the convention); RAKOVE,
supranote 7, at 368-98 (describing events leading to Philadelphia Convention); 1 FARRAND,
RECORDS, supra note 44, at 19 (recording discussion at opening of convention as to the need
to give Congress additional commercial powers).

147. See supra Part IV.B.1.b.; Madison, supra note 99, at 348-53.
148. See Madison, supra note 99, at 348-53; MARKS, supra note 127, at 52-95; RAKOVE,

supra note 7, at 347-70. As a leading commentator summarizes:
Inability to command compliance with its foreign policy virtually ensured
Congress's failure [under the Articles]. Congress could not raise revenue,
bargain effectively [or] enforce a common commercial policy ....
Foreign
nations, notably Britain and Spain, refused to agree to lower trade barriers
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c. Embargoes
A third controverted category of foreign commerce power
concerned embargoes. Unlike trade and imposts, this issue did not
centrally occupy the debates of the mid-1780s, as its immediacy

dissipated after the conclusion of the Revolution. In the early
months of government under the Articles, however, it briefly
emerged as a major issue. During the Revolution, states imposed
embargoes on the export of particular products, and upon trade
with Britain in general. 4 9 However, in a familiar pattern, the
lack of national coordination rendered these measures largely
ineffectual. In 1781, while hostilities were continuing, a committee
of Congress met to consider changes to the Articles. Ultimately, the
committee recommended seven additional articles, including one
granting power to Congress to impose embargoes in wartime.8 0 As
with the other foreign trade powers, no one thought of this as an
inherent power. Rather, the posture of the committee was providing
as to additional powers it should
recommendations to Congress
5
solicit from the states.1 '
Congress never acted on the committee's recommendation,
perhaps-at least with respect to embargoes-because hostilities
because they knew that Congress could not prevent the states from closing off
or taxing trade. States would not cooperate to win trade concessions from
foreign nations, Congress could not guarantee that states would change their
laws to comply with trade treaties, and neither the states nor Congress could
impose meaningful sanctions.
Yoo, supra note 126, at 2013-14.
149. See, e.g., 10 HENING, supra note 83, at 105 (1779) (act authorizing governor to impose
embargoes); 11 id. at 101-03 (1782) (law limiting trade in British goods); id. at 136-38 (1782)
(same, enacted on recommendation of U.S. Congress); 1 LAWSOFMASSACHUSETTS, supranote
102, at 1114-15 (Sept. 8,1779) (embargo on certain items); 1 LAWS OFMASSACHUSETTS, supra
note 102, at 51 (Mar. 3, 1781) (limitation on British commerce); 9 LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA,
supra note 83, at 272 (Sept. 7, 1778) (embargo of specified items); id. at 288 (Sept. 10, 1778)
(embargo on trade with Britain); 10 id. at 417 (Apr. 10, 1782) (limitations on British
commerce); id. at 497 (Sept. 20, 1782) (same).
150. See 20 JOURNALS, supranote 98, at 469-70.
151. See RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 290. In contrast, the same committee also proposed a
revision giving Congress an explicit power to coerce states to abide by the Articles (chiefly
directed at states failing to pay money requested by Congress). See id. at 289-90. As to this
power, the committee argued that Congress already had "a general and implied power...
to enforce and carry into effect all the Articles of the said Confederation against any of the
States...." but recommended that the power nonetheless be made explicit. 20 JOURNALS,
supra note 98, at 469-70 (Mar. 12, 1781).
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seemed near conclusion by the end of 1781. As a result, however,
Congress was thought not to have the power of embargo. The
decline in de facto hostilities brought a reemergence of trade with
Britain, still nominally an enemy; because Congress lacked power
to suppress this trade, it had to rely upon the uneven efforts of the
states.'52 Similarly, when the Confederation encountered hostilities
from the piratical state of Algiers in the mid-1780s, Foreign
Secretary Jay recommended that an embargo upon countries
friendly to Algiers might be an appropriate response. Congress took
no action on the matter, presumably because it assumed that
it lacked direct power over the matter and coordination of
embargoes at the state level had proved futile.' As with commercial regulations and the impost, the matter of embargoes shows that
Congress under the Articles simply did not have the power
necessary to respond effectively to foreign threats.
2. Enforcement of the Law of Nations
Another troublesome issue under the Articles of Confederation
was the enforcement of the law of nations. The Constitution
declares that Congress has power "[t]o define and punish ...
Offenses against the Law of Nations."'5 4 The Articles contained no
comparable language, which gave rise to the danger during the
confederation period that states' refusal to enforce the law of
nations would subject the Union to international reprisals. As
Madison described the problem: "The[ ] articles contain no provision
for the case of offenses against the law of nations; and consequently
leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the
Confederacy with foreign nations. " "'
That view is consistent with historical practice under the
Articles. At various times during the 1780s, foreign countries
152. See 25 JOURNALS, supranote 98, at 585, 589 (Sept. 19, 1783) (discussing difficulties

with British trade); see also 11 HENING, supra note 83, at 101-03 (1782) (act suppressing
trade with Britain, made conditional upon all other states passing similar laws); id. at 136

(1782) (same, enacted on recommendation of U.S. Congress); 10 LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA,
supra note 83, at 497 (1782) (act suppressing trade with Britain).
153. See 29 JOURNALS, supranote 98, at 842-44 (Oct. 20, 1785).
154. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
155. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 274 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)

(emphasis added).
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appealed to Congress to protect rights under the law of nations.
Congress perceived at least some of these appeals as quite serious
and threatening matters. However, Congress also thought it lacked
power to act, and in each instance referred the matter to the
relevant state government.
A leading example was the assault on a French diplomat
accredited to Congress in Philadelphia. France demanded that
Congress surrender the assailant, De Longchamps, to French
authorities. Congress asked Foreign Secretary John Jay to
explain to [the French representative] the difficulties that may
arise on this head from the nature of a federal union in which
each State retains a distinct and absolute sovereignty in all
matters not expressly delegated to Congress leaving to them
[i.e., Congress] only that of advising in many of those cases in
which other governments decree.156
Congress further directed Jay to suggest that the French apply
instead to the Pennsylvania government, and for itself merely
recommended that the states pass laws "for punishing the
infractions of the laws of nations, and more especially for securing
the privileges and immunities of public Ministers from foreign
powers." 5 ' Similar incidents occurred, for example, with respect to
unlawful seizures of foreign ships in Massachusetts in 1783 and
South Carolina in 1784; in both cases the foreign nation appealed
to Congress, and Congress referred the matter to the relevant
state. 5 8 As a result, the states and not Congress dealt with foreign
powers in matters concerning the law of nations during the
confederation period. Although this was seen as a dysfunctional
system, it was thought inevitable given the limited grants offoreign
relations power in the Articles.'
156. 28 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 308, 314 (Apr. 27, 1785).
157. 29 id. at 655 (Aug. 24, 1785). Although Pennsylvania refused to surrender the
assailant to French authorities, a major diplomatic incident was averted when the
Pennsylvania courts imposed a substantial penalty upon him under Pennsylvania law. See
Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 111 (1784).
158. See 24 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 227-28 (Apr. 4, 1783) (directing, in response to
application of Spanish minister, that appropriate recourse was to the government of
Massachusetts); 27 id. at 509-11 (June 2, 1784) (referring complaint of Netherlands
government to the governor of South Carolina).
159. See 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supranote 44, at 19 (recording Randolph's criticisms ofthe
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Again, it is difficult to reconcile this view with a theory of
inherent foreign affairs power. Matters relating to the laws of
nations plainly concern external sovereignty. If Congress had
inherent foreign affairs powers in the mid-1780s, that at least
should have been considered as a basis for congressional action. Yet
the confederation government was thought not to have the power
to act in support of the law of nations, and at the Convention the
delegates thought that this should be remedied by a grant of such
powers to the federal government in the Constitution.160
3. Enforcement of Treaties
Relatedly, serious problems arose under the Articles from state
violations of U.S. treaty obligations. The leading difficulties arose
from two provisions of the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Britain. 6 ' A
number of states had passed laws during the Revolution
confiscating or discharging debts owed by their citizens to British
creditors.16 2 Britain insisted that these be repealed, and the
Confederation, in the peace treaty, agreed that "no lawful
impediment" should be met by British debtors in collecting pre-war
debts. 1 0s In addition, Britain requested and the Confederation
agreed that following the peace, Loyalists should have the ability
Articles to the Constitutional Convention, including the fact that state violations of the law
of nations could not be controlled by the national government). In addition to the De
Longchamps incident and the ship seizures, another leadinglaw ofnations controversy of the
Confederation period involved New York's authorization ofclaims against British merchants
for using abandoned revolutionary property during the occupation of New York City. The
British claimed the law ofnations permitted such use, but New York appeared to reject that
defense. Congress again found itself entirely on the sidelines as the matter came to trial in
New York state court asRutgersv. Waddington in 1784. SeeArguments and Judgmentof the
Mayor's Court of the City of New-York, in A CAUSE BETWEEN ELIZABETH RUTGERS AND
JOSHUA WADDINGTON (1784), reprinted in THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 393 (Julius Goebel Jr. ed., 1964). Again, a major diplomatic
incident was avoided by ajudicious decision of the state court (in this instance deciding that
New York law should be interpreted in conformity with the law ofnations). On the Rutgers
litigation, see WOOD, supranote 48, at 457-59, and Yoo, supra note 126, at 2016-18.
160. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 10.
161. Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States ofAmerica and his Britannic
Majesty, Sept. 4, 1783, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, 8 stat. 80, 82 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris].
162. See, e.g., RISJORD, supra note 144, at 75, 106 (Maryland); id. at 109-114 (Virginia);
id. at 119, 129 (North Carolina).
163. See Treaty of Paris, supranote 161, art. IV, at 82.
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discrimination.'"
Despite the treaty, several states-notably Virginia with respect
to debts and Pennsylvania and New York with respect to returning
Loyalists-refused to comply.165 Britain argued, threatened, and
ultimately refused to surrender military posts in U.S. territory
whose evacuation had been promised, causing considerable unease
in the confederation government.'6 6 Congress took Britain's side,
and requested that the states comply with the treaty."7 The states

continued to refuse. 6 This unfortunate circumstance prompted the
drafters of the Constitution to include treaties as supreme law of
the land under Article VI, and as an element of federal jurisdiction
that the federal courts could enforce treaties
under Article II,,so
169
law.
state
despite
164. See id.art. VI, at 83 (declaring that "there shall be no future confiscations made, nor
any prosecutions commenced against any person or persons for, or by reason of the part
which he or they may have taken in the present war, and that no person shall, on that
account, suffer any future loss or damage, either in his person, liberty or property").
165. On Pennsylvania, see ROBERT L. BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA 1776-1790, at 140-41 (1942) (discussing Pennsylvania's restrictions against
returning Loyalists settlingin the state). On Virginia, see RISJORD, supranote 144, at 109-16
(discussing unsuccessful attempts to modifyVirginia's debt cancellation statutes to conform
to the treaty). On New York, see A Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New
York, in 3 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAmLTON, 1782-1786, at 483 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob

E. Cooke eds., 1962) (opposing New York's antiloyalist legislation); see also 24 JOURNALS,
supra note 98, at 373-74 (May 30, 1783) (recording objections of'Virginia and Pennsylvania

to provisions of treaty).
166. See MARKS, supra note 127, at 5-11 (linking Britain's refusal to evacuate the posts
with states' intransigence on the matter ofthe debts); see also BRUNHOUSE, supra note 165,
at 140-41 (noting that the British initially refused to evacuate New York City after the peace
treaty, partly in response to Pennsylvania's antiloyalist legislation).
167. See 32 JOURNALS, supranote 98, at 177-84 (Mar. 21, 1787).
168. As Hamilton described the situation prior to the Constitution:
The treaties of the United States under the present Constitution [i.e., the
Articles] are liable to the infractions of thirteen different legislatures... The
faith, the reputation, the peace of the whole Union are thus continually at the
mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of every member of
which it is composed.
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 183 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
169. See Jack N. Rakove, Solving a ConstitutionalPuzzle: The Treatymaking Clauseas a
Case Study, in 1 PERSPEcTivES ON AMERICAN HISTORY 233, 264 (1984); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 95-96 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987):
Under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as well as the
laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the
same manner-whereas adjudications on the same points and questions in
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This well-known sequence of events seriously undercuts the
Curtiss-Wright theory. Obviously, the debt confiscation issue and
the treatment of returning Loyalists were substantial matters
of foreign affairs, nearly provoking renewed war with Britain. Yet
under the Confederation the states played a major role in it,
and the Congress seemed to lack any recourse against state
obstruction.1 70 It is true that some prominent figures, including
Hamilton and Jay, thought the states lacked the right (though not
the practical ability) to violate confederation treaties. But in
arguing against the states, they appealed not to an inherent
distribution of foreign affairs power, but to the language of the
Articles, in terms that made clear their understanding that any
power held by Congress in this regard was power given to Congress
by the states in the document itself. Hamilton, for example, asked:
Does not the act of confederation place the exclusive right of
war and peace in the United States in Congress?... Are not
these among the first rights of sovereignty, and does not the
delegation ofthem to the general confederacy, so far abridge the
sovereignty of each particular state?'
He went on to argue that the delegation of the treaty power implied
a cession by the states of the power to obstruct treaties.'72 Similarly
Jay argued that the states "by express delegation of power, formed
and vested in Congress perfect though limited sovereignty"
including powers of war and peace, and this "express delegation"
implied an agreement to be bound by congressional treaties.'7" In
short, the argument against state power in this area assumed that
the issue turned on the extent of delegation in the Articles.
Inherent foreign affairs power simply was not a consideration.
thirteen [S]tates... will not always accord or be consistent. .... The wisdom
of the convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment
of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national government cannot
be too much commended. (emphasis added).
170. See Madison, supra note 99, at 349; 1 FARRAND, RECORDS, supra note 44, at 316
(statement of Madison).
171. Letter from Phocionto the Considerate Citizens ofNew York, supranote 165, at 489.
172. See id. In the Waddington case, discussed supraat note 159, Hamilton pressed this
argument to the New York courts, which decided the case in his favor, but on other grounds.
173. 31 JOURNAIS, supra note 98, at 847 (Oct. 13, 1786) (report by Jay on the issue of
treaty violations by the states).
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C. The InherentPowers Theory Revisited
The foregoing practice makes it difficult to argue that there was
a widespread understanding of inherent powers in foreign affairs
under the Articles. It is essentially incontestable that everyone
during the relevant period thought that (a) the Confederation
lacked power over foreign commerce and navigation, and matters
arising under treaties and the law of nations; (b) the state
governments had power over these matters; (c) this was a problem;
and (d) that the problem should be fixed by including these powers
in further grants of power to the national government, ultimately
1 74
in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
The only way this could be consistent with the Curtiss-Wright
theory is if matters relating to foreign commerce, treaties, and the
law of nations were not attributes of "external sovereignty," or, in
Sutherland's phrase, not powers that concern our relations with
other nations. This seems implausible: many of the foreign
commerce powers at issue seem purely external-for example, the
power to limit the ability of foreign nationals to import goods, or the
ability of foreign ships to enter U.S. waters. The claim is also
inconsistent with Curtiss-Wright itself, for power over foreign
commerce was the matter at issue in Curtiss-Wright. Obviously,
Sutherland and the Curtiss-WrightCourt thought it was a matter
of external sovereignty. Indeed, the specific issue in Curtiss-Wright
is arguably less "external" in that it concerned exports and thus
represented a regulation of U.S. goods within the United States; by
174. See, for example, Hamilton's discussion in Federalist 22, in which he observes that
"[t]he want of a power to regulate commerce [on the part of the confederation government].
... has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers"

and further notes that
Several states have endeavored by separate prohibitions, restrictions, and
exclusions to influence the conduct of [Great Britain] in this particular, but the
want of concert, arising from the want of a general authority and from clashing

and dissimilar views in the States, has hitherto frustrated every experiment of
the kind....
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 177 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
Significantly, historians Morris and Rakove, the leading advocates of a "nationalist"
interpretation of the revolutionary period, are fully in accord with the foregoing picture of
foreign affairs powers under the Articles. See RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE FORGING OF THE
UNION, 1781-89, at 130-61, 194-219 (1987); RAKOVE, supra note 7, at 331-95; cf supranotes

43-47 (discussing these authors' endorsement of the view that the Union preceded the states).
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contrast, the regulations debated in the 1780s concerned whether
goods would be allowed into the United States in the first instance.
Moreover, treaties and the law of nations, by definition, involve
relationships between the nation and external powers, and they
relate at their core to matters of "war and peace," which have
always been at the center of external sovereignty.7 5 If the power of
"external sovereignty" does not extend to matters of foreign
commerce and matters governed by treaties and the laws ofnations,
it would seem to have an almost contentlessly narrow meaning. As
a result, practice under the Articles is entirely inconsistent with
Sutherland's theory.
I note three potential, but ultimately unsustainable, objections.
First, it might be argued that all of the foregoing matters on which
the states legislated (and Congress did not) during the confederation period were ultimately domestic internal matters, though
concededly having international implications. Thus, although these
matters did affect foreign affairs, they were not direct aspects of the
Union's relationship with foreign nations. Perhaps, therefore,
Curtiss-Wright could be defended more narrowly as ascribing to
"external sovereignty" not all matters with foreign affairs
implications, but only actual attempts to influence the conduct of
foreign nations.
The difficulty with this argument is that many of the key issues
on which the states legislated (and Congress did not) were purely
matters of influencing foreign nations. Most obviously, the key issue
in the campaign for broader commercial powers was the need to
gain leverage against foreign nations in pursuit of open access to
foreign markets. While Congress unsuccessfully sought such
powers, many of the states enacted legislation specifically designed
to pressure foreign nations-particularly Britain-to lower trade
barriers. Massachusetts's elaborate trade regulations of 1785 were
an example: among other things, they enhanced duties and severely
curtailed the navigation rights of countries establishing trade
barriers against U.S. commerce, singling out Britain in particular
for adverse treatment. 176 Massachusetts then attempted to
175. See THE FEDERALiSTNo. 3 (John Jay) (discussing relationship between treaties and
matters of war and peace).
176. See 1 LAws OFMASSACHUSETTS, supranote 102, at 99 (Act of June 23, 1785); see also

id. at 439 (Act ofNov. 29,1785) (continuing discriminatory duties on Britain but ending them
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coordinate similar action in other states, meeting some success in
New England but ultimately failing nationwide. 7 Other states,
notably Virginia and Pennsylvania, independently enacted laws
singling out for adverse treatment nations that did not give open
access to U.S. commerce and granting special privileges to nations
favoring the United States. 178 Nor was this practice limited to
commercial regulations. In the context of treaty enforcement, for
example, Virginia attempted to coerce Britain into compliance with
the Treaty of Paris by conditioning repeal of its anti-British
legislation upon Britain's surrender of the western military posts
in accordance with the treaty.179 In short, even in matters in which
the United States directly sought to influence foreign nations, the
initiative lay at the state level rather than with Congress.
A second objection might be that Congress was thought to lack
power to act in these areas for a different structural reason: most,
if not all, of these matters involved the exercise of legislative power,
whereas Congress under the Confederation was thought to be, as
one member described it, "a deliberating Executive assembly."'
Though commentators have generally concurred in describing
Congress's power as generally executive,' Congress did exercise
against other nations).
177. See 1 LAWS OFMASSACHUSETTS, supra note 102, at 726,768 (1785) (recounting efforts
at coordination with New Hampshire and Rhode Island); id. at 36 (1786) (suspending state
navigation act due to lack of nationwide cooperation).
178. See 12 HENING, supranote 83, at 32 (1785) (enacting discriminatory duties on"every
ship or vessel trading to this commonwealth, owned wholly or in part by a British subject");
id. at 289-90 (1786) (varying import duties depending upon whether country oforigin had a
commercial treaty with United States); 11 id, at 494 (1784) (act directing that arms
purchases be made from France); 10 id. at 202 (1779) (act granting commercial privileges to
nations recognizing the independence of the United States); 11 LAWS OF PENNSYLVANIA,
supra note 83, at 182 (Apr. 2, 1785) (act granting commercial privileges to nations
recognizingthe independence of the United States); 12 id. at 99 (Sept. 20, 1785) (actimposing
discriminatory duties on countries without commercial treaties with United States); id. at
103 (Sept. 20, 1785) (act imposing discriminatory duties on Portugal "to continue for so long
as the flour of America is prohibited from being imported into the kingdom and territories
[of Portugal]-).
179. See 12 HENING, supranote 83, at 528 (1787).
180. RAKOVE, supranote 7, at 202 (quoting North Carolina delegate Thomas Burke); see
also id. at 381-83 (noting that some opponents of giving Congress taxing and regulatory
power argued that these were legislative powers not properly delegated to an executive body
such as Congress).
181. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original
Understandingof War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167,235-41 (1996) (concluding that Congress
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legislative powers in areas it thought appropriate.1 82 For example,
Congress promulgated military regulations, passed laws with
respect to the territories (most notably the Northwest Ordinance of
1787), and developed laws with respect to the mail.1'3 If Congress
had thought it had general foreign affairs power (as it did believe
it had power over the continental army, the territories and the
mail), surely these instances of congressional legislative power
would have served as models for foreign affairs-related ordinances.
This seems particularly true in areas in which Congress could have
imposed legislative authority without infringing the territorial
integrity of any state-as it could have, for example, in regulating
what ships and cargoes would be permitted to enter U.S. waters.
The failure to act in foreign affairs matters seems to reflect a lack
of foreign affairs powers in particular, not a lack of legislative
power in general.
Third, it may be argued that, whatever the practice, a theory of
inherent, extratextual powers existed during the confederation
period. As a leading example, Congress in 1781 chartered a national
bank, although nothing in the Articles appeared to give it such a
power.'" James Wilson, among other defenders of congressional
action, explicitly relied on a theory of inherent powers, arguing that
the delegated powers limitation of Article II applied only to powers
that could be possessed by the states. Because the power over a
national bank was unavoidably a national power unexerciseable by
any state in isolation, he argued, it could not be a delegated power
18 5
but was, rather, a power existing inherently in the Union.
was primarily an executive body).

182. See Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Under.
standing, and Treaties as "SupremeLaw of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095,2117 (1999)
(noting that "historians of the era conventionally point out that the Confederation Congress

possessed a jumble of all three powers [i.e., legislative, executive and judicial]").
183. See 27 JOURNALS, supra note 98, at 582-85 (1784) (discussing enforcement of

congressional postal regulations); Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the
United States North-West of the River Ohio (July 13, 1787), reprintedin 1 DOcUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 5, at 168 (providing governing rules for the Northwest Territory); see
also WOOD, supra note 48, at 355 (commenting on extent of congressional regulatory
activity).
184. See 2 WHISON, supra note 97, at 828-29 (discussing the National Bank controversy).
185. See id. at 829-30; see also Letter of George Mason to Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 27,
1781), in 2 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792, at 697-99 (Robert A. Rutland ed.,
1970) (referring to and criticizing arguments based on inherent sovereignty of the national
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As noted, this study attempts no conclusion with respect to the
general theory of inherent powers. It is debatable to what extent
Wilson's theory of inherent powers was representative, but whatever the correct outcome of that debate it does not support the
specific idea of inherent power in foreign affairs. Indeed, the more
fully articulated the idea of inherent powers in some areas, the
more striking it is that inherent powers were not claimed in
foreign affairs. As discussed, the need for additional congressional
activity in foreign affairs was, as a policy matter, generally agreed.
Congress failed to act largely because it was thought to lack power,
and the specific proposals for granting Congress additional power
foundered upon the extreme procedural difficulty of amending the
Articles.' 86 If there was an idea of inherent power in foreign affairs,
it should have been deployed to address this impasse. It was not.
Whether this was because the theory of inherent powers in general
was not widely shared, or because inherent powers, though
accepted in theory, were thought inapplicable to foreign affairs, is
of no consequence to the specific inquiry posed in this Article. In
either event, there was no acceptance of a theory of inherent power
in foreign affairs under the Articles of Confederation.
D. Reliance upon the Articles by the Drafters of the Constitution
None of the foregoing discussion is automatically determinative
of the proper view of the government under the Constitution: in
adopting the Constitution the ratifiers were not merely building
upon the Confederation, but were adopting an entirely new system.
It is theoretically possible, as Louis Henkin suggests,' that even
if the confederation government did not have inherent power in
foreign affairs the new government might. However, it seems clear
that in drafting the foreign affairs provisions of the Constitution the
drafters in fact had the precedent of the Articles very much in
government).

186. See supra Part ILI.B.
187. See HENKIN, supra note 2, at 19:

Even if it were assumed, contrary to Justice Sutherland, that the states were
each independently sovereign up to (and even during) the regime ofthe Articles
of Confederation, the crux of Sutherland's theory might yet stand: the states
irrevocably gave up external sovereignty, and the United States became one

sovereign nation, upon adopting the Constitution but outside its framework....
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mind, and while altering the allocations of power, adopted the same
essential structure of powers derived solely from the document
itself.
As noted, many of the provisions of the Articles were adapted
with detailed modifications into the new Constitution. For example,
the power of appointing and receiving ambassadors was carried
over from the Articles, but the power of appointing and receiving
consuls was added.188 The treaty power was carried over but
modified so that states were not able to violate treaty obligations.189
The restriction on states sending ambassadors was dropped, but
provisions against states entering into international agreements
were strengthened: under the Articles states could make treaties
with congressional assent, and there was no restriction on their
making lesser international agreements; under the Constitution,
state treaties were banned outright, and states could make lesser
international obligations only with the consent of Congress. 9
Under the Articles, states could issue letters of marque only during
wartime; under the Constitution they could not issue them at all.191
Moreover, the drafters of the Constitution explicitly described
their project as carrying over the foreign relations powers and
restrictions of the Articles into the new document, with modifications to remedy the Articles' defects. For example, in Madison's
description:
The powers to make treaties and to send and receive
ambassadors speak their own propriety. Both of them are
comprised in the Articles of Confederation, with this difference
only, that the former is disembarrassed by the plan of the
convention, of an exception under which treaties might be
substantially frustrated by regulations of the states.' 92
Similarly, with respect to restrictions on the states, Madison
observed that "[tihe prohibition against treaties, alliances, and
confederations makes a part of the existing articles of Union; and
188. See U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, § 1.
189. See U.S. CONST. art.H, § 2, cl. 2, art. VI, cl. 2; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX,

§ 1.

190. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, § 1.
191. See U.S. CONST. art.I, § 10 cl. 1; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. VI, § 5.
192. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 273 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).

2000]

EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER

431

for reasons which need no explanation, is copied into the new
Constitution."19 With respect to letters of marque and reprisal, he
continued:
The prohibition of letters of marque is another part of the old
system, but is somewhat extended in the new. According to the
former, letters of marque could be granted by the States after
a declaration of war; according to the latter, these licenses must
be obtained, as well during war as previous to its declaration,
from the government of the United States. This alteration is
fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all points which
relate to foreign powers, and of immediate responsibility to the
nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself is to be
responsible."M
In short, the drafters thought about foreign affairs powers as
they did other powers. Foreign affairs powers were granted to the
national government, or denied to the states, by the terms of the
national government's governing document. Careful attention to
detail was required to achieve the best allocation of powers between
the national government and the states. This is confirmed by the
language of both the Articles and the Constitution, by practice
under the Articles and by the drafters' own explanation of what
they had written. They had no idea of an inherent division of
powers into "external sovereignty" and "internal sovereignty" that
automatically governed which powers would be held by the national
government and which by the states, but were groping for the right
balance in a very real, practical manner-carrying over allocations
from the Articles to the Constitution where they seemed to work,
and making adjustments where problems had arisen. CurtissWrights abstract and artificial theory of sovereignty simply does
not describe what was actually happening.
IV. RATIFICATION AND THE TENTH A!ENDMENT

Foreign affairs powers went largely unaddressed in the debates
over ratification of the Constitution. There was broad consensus
193. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 286 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
194. Id at 286.
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that the national government should, in general, be the representative of the United States in foreign affairs.1 95 Even opponents
of the Constitution generally agreed that the national government's
power should extend to "causes arising on the seas, to commerce,
imports, armies, navies, Indian affairs, [and] peace and war. " "' The
specific foreign affairs powers discussed in the Constitution did not
go much beyond the Articles, with the addition of the proposed
revisions to the Articles that had received broad (though less than
unanimous) approbation in the mid-1780s. 197 Because of this broad
consensus, the Federalists and Anti-Federalist, in the course of
debating the Constitution, had little occasion to discuss foreign
affairs powers. As a result, there is little direct evidence from the
ratifying debates affirming or denying the specific claim of
extraconstitutional power in foreign affairs. 9 '
Rather, the difficulty for proponents ofextraconstitutional power
in foreign affairs is that the theory seems inconsistent with the
broader understanding-widely advanced during the debates-that
the federal government is a government of enumerated powers
in which "every thing which is not given, is reserved." 99 That
195. See MARMS, supra note 127, at 167-206. For representative views, see, for example,
Letter from George Washington to the Executives of the States (Mar. 15, 1783), in 13
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at 60; 2, Letter in Philadelphia Freeman's Journal
(May 16, 1787), in 13 id. at 98 (arguing that Congress ought to have exclusive power over
foreign affairs); Madison, supranote 99, at 248-53.
196. Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, I (Oct. 8, 1787), reprintedin 14

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at 18, 24. On the Anti-Federalist acceptance of the
national government's power in foreign affairs, see Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall,

Jr., The Constitutionalityof State and Local SanctionsAgainst ForeignCountries:Affzirsof
State, States Affairs, or a Sorry State of Affairs?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307, 318 n.56
(1999) (collecting authorities).
197. See THE FEDERALIST NOs. 42, 43 (James Madison) (comparing Constitution and
Articles of Confederation with respect to foreign affairs powers); see also 1 FARRAND,

RECORDS, supra note 44, at 242-45 (reporting the so-called "New Jersey plan" presented at
the Constitutional Convention by William Paterson as a proposal for limited revision of the
Articles).

198. The one controversial provision was the clause in Article VI making treaties supreme
over state law of their own force. See 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 3, at 187, 215 (N.C.
Convention); 3 id. at 215, 500-03 (Va. Convention). However, it was assumed that Congress
would appropriately have power to enforce treaties by Article I, Section 8, even in the

absence of this provision. See Yoo, supra note 126, at 2055.
199. 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at 339 (address by James Wilson in
Philadelphia); see also 2 id. at 454-56 (statements of James Wilson to Pennsylvania
Convention) (stating that federal government consists only of enumerated powers, and that
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understanding, of course, was a centerpiece of the Federalist
defense of the Constitution. The Anti-Federalist feared national
power and accordingly sought rhetorically to invest the proposed
national government with broad and ill-defined powers. 2" In reply,
the Federalists insisted first that the new national government
could exercise only the powers given it by the constitutional text,
and second, that those powers had limited scope. "The powers
delegated ... to the federal government," said Madison in The
Federalist, "are few and defined."2 0 ' As Madison further argued at
the Virginia Convention, echoing Wilson, the principle of the
Constitution was that "every power not granted thereby remains
with the people ....
Can the general government exercise any
power not delegated?... The reverse of the proposition
holds. The
20 2
delegation alone warrants the exercise of any power."
These assertions did not entirely convince the Anti-Federalist.
Various state conventions proposed amendments which, among
other things, would declare the principle explicitly. In Massa-

chusetts, for example, Governor Hancock proposed to add language
"that all powers not expressly delegated by the aforementioned
Constitution are reserved to the several states ... 203 Samuel
Adams, in support, argued that the provision was appropriate as
confirming that "if any law[s] made by the federal government shall
extend beyond the power granted by the proposed Constitution,"

they would be invalid.0 4 In subsequently drafting the Tenth
failure to enumerate a power would cause it to be outside the government's authority).
200. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supranote 3, at 398-99 (statement of Thomas Tredwell
that all rights not specifically reserved by the people are transferred to the national
government).
201. THE FEDERAIiST No. 45, at 296 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
202. 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 3, at 620; see also 4 id. at 259 (statement of Charles
Pinckney to the South Carolina Convention that "no powers could be executed, or assumed,
but such as were expressly delegated"). For additional discussion and quotation on this point,
see Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The 'Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A
JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 315-22 (1993).
203. 2 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 3, at 177 (Mass. Convention).
204. 2 id, at 131 (Feb. 1,1788); see also Letter from the Federal Farmer to the Republican,
No. 16 (Jan. 20, 1788), reprinted in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 5, at 342
(describing federal government as 'possessing only enumerated power" but proposing early
form ofthe Tenth Amendment as away ofquieting Anti-Federalist fears on this subject). On
the Anti-Federalist skepticism of the enumerated powers reading, see, for example, 2 ELLIoT,
DEBATES, supra note 3, at 396 (statement of Thomas Tredwell to the New York Convention)
(arguing that absent an express statement the usual interpretation of a constitution would
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Amendment, whose purpose, the Supreme Court later said, was "to
allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise
powers not granted,"" 5 Madison substantially tracked the proposals
of the state conventions in this regard: "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the constitution nor prohibited by it to the
206
states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."
These events, which are not seriously in dispute, seem conclusively to reject any idea of extraconstitutional federal power. If,
as Madison said, "delegation alone warrants the exercise of any
power"20 7 then obviously there is no basis for claims of inherent
power, and the history of the Tenth Amendment shows that it was,
at a minimum, designed specifically to confirm that Madison's
statement was a correct description of the constitution system.
Indeed, the difficulty is to understand how any coherent theory of
extraconstitutional power could survive the Tenth Amendment.
The rejoinder is as follows. First, although no one seriously
challenges the idea of enumerated powers as the basic framework
of the Constitution, there may be particular exceptions to it.
Despite the unqualified statements of the Tenth Amendment and
much contemporaneous commentary, there is some evidence that
the concept was not wholly comprehensive. Second, because of the
obvious national characteristics of foreign affairs, it is likely that
foreign affairs power was one of the exceptions. As Curtiss-Wright
asserted:
The broad statement that the federal government can exercise
no powers except those specifically enumerated in the

Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and
proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs....

be that it granted a general power).
205. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
206. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supranote 80, at 441 (statement
ofJames Madison) (introducing the proposal that became the Tenth Amendment and stating
"I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the State conventions, that several
[states] are particularly anxious that it should be declared in the Constitution, that the
powers not therein delegated should be reserved to the several States.... [Tihere can be no
harm in making such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that the fact is as stated. I am
sure I understand it so, and do therefore propose it").
207. 3 ELLOT, DEBATES, supranote 3, at 620.
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[Tihe powers of external sovereignty [do] not depend upon the
affirmative grants of the Constitution.0 8
On the more general point, the ratification debates provide at
least some support. For example, some Federalists qualified the
reserved powers of the states to include only powers traditionally
exercised by the states. 0 9 Wilson, for one, seemingly acknowledged
a (limited) view of inherent powers in describing the federal
government as one where "powers are particularly enumerated, and
where nothing more is intended to be given than what is so
unless it results from the nature of the government
enumerated,
210
itself."
The Curtiss-Wrightargument fails, however, on the second point.
Even if some ratifiers had some notion of inherent powers, there is
no evidence to suggest that anyone thought foreign affairs powers
were inherent powers. First, nothing in the ratifying debates lends
any direct support to an understanding of foreign affairs powers as
inherent powers. It can be defended only as a background understanding so fundamental and commonly shared that it remained
unstated. But background understandings must arise from some
source. In the constitutional context, I can identify only two
plausible candidates. First, the Constitution itself might imply that
a subject matter was beyond its purview. For example, if the
Constitution does not mention an entire set of powers, one might
plausibly assume that the Constitution simply was not addressed
to such matters. Second, common practice prior to the Constitution
might give rise to an assumption that the Constitution did not
contemplate a fundamental change in the area. If Congress under
the Articles was thought to have an inherent power in a particular
area, that power might be assumed to carry over to the new
government even in the absence of a statement to that effect; if the
states did not exercise a power under the Articles one might think
that was not a power "reserved" to the states by the Tenth
208. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 515-16, 318 (1936); see
also Clark, supra note 7, at 1296-97 (quoting this language from Curtiss-Wright).
209. See 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 3, at 419 (statement ofJohn Marshall).
210. 2 id. at 436 (statement of James Wilson to Pennsylvania Convention) (emphasis
added). I offer no opinion here as to the merits of these observations, as I think the CurtissWright claim fails on its specific application to foreign affairs.
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Amendment, despite that Amendment's seemingly comprehensive
language.
Whatever one thinks of these arguments as a general matter, it
should be clear from the discussion above that neither applies to
foreign affairs powers. The Constitution is not silent on foreign
affairs matters; rather, it specifically allocates most of the
important foreign affairs powers between the states and the federal
government, and among the branches of the federal government. A
person having no previous idea of inherent powers in foreign affairs
would not derive such an idea from the constitutional language.
Further, the context of the Constitutional Convention undercuts
such a claim, for the Convention was called, in large part, to remedy
the foreign affairs difficulties of the government under the
Articles."' Foreign affairs power, far from being outside the
purview of the Constitution, is one of the central points of the
Constitution.
In addition, as demonstrated above, no concept of inherent
foreign affairs power was reflected in the text of the Articles or in
practice under the Articles. Congress, while operating under the
Articles, did not exercise inherent foreign affairs powers. In
situations where a foreign affairs power was not granted to
Congress by the text of the Articles, Congress thought it lacked that
power, and refrained from exercising it even when action by
Congress seemed the only effective system. 2 ' Where a foreign
affairs power was not denied to the states by the text of the
Articles, the states thought they possessed the power (and
frequently exercised it) even where its exercise by the states seemed
unwise. This pattern was repeated with respect to the impost,
navigation acts, and other restraints of international trade,
embargoes and enforcement of the law of nations and of treaties-in
short, the major foreign affairs powers unmentioned by the
Articles.1 3 The ratifiers of the Constitution would not have
imported into their reading of the constitutional text a preconceived
idea of inherent power in foreign affairs, and nothing in the text or
surrounding context would have suggested such an idea as an
211. See MARKS, supra note 127, at x; Rakove, supranote 169, at 267-68; Yoo, supranote

126, at 2013-14.
212. See supra Part III.
213. See id.
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initial matter. It seems, therefore, implausible to assert a
background understanding of extraconstitutional power in foreign
affairs. Lacking clear evidence of such a background understanding
there seems no justification for reading the Tenth Amendment not
to apply to foreign affairs.
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER

As argued above, Curtiss-Wright is historically indefensible. It
rests on a theory of inherent powers not held by any prominent
member of the constitutional generation and contrary to the text
and history of both the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution. However, as Louis Henkin has written, "[s]tudents of
the Constitution may have to accept Sutherland's theory, with its
difficulties, or leave constitutional deficiencies unrepaired." 14
Specifically, in the absence of Curtiss-Wright how do we resolve
three central dilemmas of constitutional foreign relations: the
incomplete allocation of foreign affairs power to the federal
government, the incomplete division of foreign affairs powers
among the branches of the federal government and the incomplete
denial of foreign affairs power to the states?
Although each of these difficulties requires its own complete
treatment, it is possible to sketch the beginnings of an answer to
each. My point here is not to be definitive, but rather to suggest
that there are alternatives to the convenient but manifestly
inaccurate theory of Curtiss-Wright.
The first problem is the dilemma of unallocated foreign relations
powers. Although the Constitution grants to the federal government
all of the leading foreign affairs powers (war, treaties, ambassadors,
etc.), a number of lesser powers are omitted. One of these is what
I have elsewhere called the "foreign policy power"-that is, the
power to "direct the moral and diplomatic force of the United
States" with respect to a particular subject.215 To take one early
example, what constitutional provision authorized President
Monroe to announce the Monroe Doctrine? It does not seem
214. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 20.
215. Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non) Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L.
REV. 133, 220-25 (1998).
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ancillary to any of the enumerated powers of Congress or the
President: it did not involve war or military force; it was not done
pursuant to an agreement with another nation; it did not involve
commerce, or naturalization, or national defense. It was not even
announced through ambassadors, but rather in a message from the
President to Congress. Nothing in the Constitution seems to
encompass the Monroe Doctrine, yet it is unthinkable that the
United States would not have the power to set its own foreign
policy, or that foreign policy pronouncements of this kind could be
made only by the states.2 16
Likewise, consider the power to make lesser international
agreements that do not rise to the level of treaties. I have elsewhere
argued that the constitutional generation understood "treaties" to
form only a subset of international agreements, namely those
involving significant issues and intended for a long duration.2 1 7
Minor, temporary undertakings were called compacts, accords, or
in more modern times protocols or understandings. Yet, the
Constitution assigns only the power to make treaties. Surely the
national government could not have the power to make major
agreements but not have the power to make minor ones.
Though Professor Henkin despairs of resolving these problems,
there is a textual solution. Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution
states that "[tihe executive Power shall be vested in a
President...."2 1 8 There are various ways of reading "the executive
Power" in this Section. One might say that this includes only the
power to "execute" the laws-that is, to act pursuant to a specific
congressional law-plus the other powers specifically given to the
President by the Constitution (pardons, commander-in-chief,
etc.). 219 Alternatively, one might say that "executive Power" includes
other powers of traditional chief executives with which the Framers
were familiar. The latter is more consistent with the common
216. See James Monroe, Message to Congress, December 2, 1823, in 41 ANNALS OF CONG.
11, 22-23 (1856) (warning European powers not to interfere with newly independent South
American republics); Ramsey, supra note 215, at 210-12 (discussing the allocation of this
power).
217. See Ramsey, supranote 215, at 160-83.

218. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
219. See James Madison, Letters of Helvidius (1793), in 1 JAMES MADISON, LEnEEsAND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 607, 614-15 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed., 1865) (taking
this position).
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eighteenth-century understanding, for Blackstone, Montesquieu,
Locke, and other writers spoke of "executive" power as encompassing more than merely acting pursuant to enactment.2 20
Specifically, these writers thought that foreign affairs powers were
an aspect of executive power (and that view is confirmed in practice,
for in Britain the Crown, identified with the executive power,
exercised most foreign affairs powers). 22' Moreover, leading
members of the constitutional generation identified "executive
power" in the Constitution with foreign affairs power early in the
postconstitutional period. Then-Secretary of State Thomas
Jefferson, in a written opinion to President Washington in 1790,
stated that: "The transaction of business with foreign nations is
Executive altogether. It belongs then to the head of that
department, except as to such portions of it as are specially
submitted to the Senate." =2 Similarly Hamilton, in defending
Washington's 1793 unilateral declaration of neutrality, identified
it as an unenumerated part of the "executive power" arising from
the executive's responsibilities in foreign affairs.'2 s
Ifwe accept the Hamilton/Jefferson view, the first Curtiss-Wright
difficulty is resolved. The "lesser" foreign affairs powers, though
apparently unallocated, are encompassed within the "executive
power," and granted to the federal government byArticle H, Section
1. Moreover, this reading solves at least part of the second problem
raised in Curtiss-Wright: even assuming the federal government
has the "unallocated" foreign affairs powers, to which branch do
they belong? Curtiss-Wright,in a separate but equally controversial
part of the opinion, argued that all of these powers were Executive
powers, because foreign affairs powers inhered naturally not only

220. See 1 WmLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs *257; JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT §§ 145-47, at 383-84 (P. Laslett ed., 1988) (1698); CHARLES DEMONTESQUIEU,
THE SPnRT OF LAWS 6K XI, ch. 6, at 69 (R. Hutchins ed., 1952) (1748).

221. See Ramsey, supra note 215, at 206-10 (discussing eighteenth-century usage of
executive power); Yoo, supra note 181, at 197-204 (same).
222. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion of Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 24, 1790), in 5 GEORGE
WASHINGTON, THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 342, 343 (Dorothy Twohig et al. eds.,
1996).
223. See Alexander Hamilton, Letters of Pacificus, No. 1 (1793), in 4 ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMLTON 432, 436-39 (Henry Cabot Lodge, ed.,
1904).

440

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:379

in the federal government, but specifically in the Executive.' In
this respect perhaps Curtiss-Wright reached something like the
right result, albeit for the wrong reasons. As argued above, the
framers did not believe in extraconstitutional grants of foreign
affairs power, nor did they believe in extraconstitutional allocations
of foreign affairs power. But perhaps they did allocate matters
roughly as Curtiss-Wright suggested: the residual, "unallocated"
foreign affairs powers are executive powers under Article 11, Section
1. Of course Congress can legislate in support of these powers,
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, but the ultimate authority
in these areas belongs to the President, so long as the powers are
those traditionally exercised by chief executives and are not
allocated elsewhere in the Constitution.2 2 5
Significantly, in many respects this solution accords with
constitutional practice. Curtiss-Wright was not an impractical
opinion: it fairly described constitutional practice. From the
beginning, interpreters of the Constitution assumed that the lesser
unallocated foreign affairs powers were held by the national
government, and specifically were held by the President.2 2 Thus,
Presidents have set foreign policy (such as the Monroe Doctrine),
entered into lesser "nontreaty" agreements with foreign nations,
and exercised various other unallocated powers, essentiallywithout
constitutional objection.22 7
The third structural difficulty supposedly resolved by CurtissWright is the role of the states in foreign affairs. Although the
Constitution specifically denies certain foreign affairs powers to the
states, there is no obvious generalized preclusion. Consequently, the
states would seem to have considerable latitude to interfere with
federal foreign policy. To many, this is troubling. The framers
224. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).

225. This reasoning is consistent with the views of Hamilton and Jefferson cited above.
See supranotes 222-23 and accompanying text. In both cases, the issue was not whether the

national government had the requisite foreign relations power, but whether the President,
as opposed to some other part of the national government, had the power. See Hamilton,
supranote 223, at 437 (discussing the proclamation of neutrality); Jefferson, supranote 222,

at 343 (discussing the appointment of diplomatic officers). But see Madison, supra note
219, at 614-15 (arguing that power to declare neutrality belongs to Congress, not the
President).
226. See Ramsey, supra note 215, at 173-83, 210-16.
227. See HENKIN, supra note 2, at 20.
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emphasized unity in foreign affairs. Madison wrote: "Ifwe are to be
one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other
nations."228 In Hamilton's view: "[Tihe peace of the WHOLE ought
not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The Union will undoubtedly
be answerable ... for the conduct of its members."229 Would such

thinkers have designed a system admitting of a multiplicity of
foreign policies formulated at the state and local level, in which a
national policy of, for example, constructive engagement with
regimes such as South Africa in the 1980s or Burma and China
today could be frustrated by state and local policies urging (or
directing) disengagement from those countries?2 °
The answer to this question depends upon what one thinks of
negative implications. If the Jefferson/Hamilton view discussed
above is correct, the unallocated foreign affairs powers of the
United States are vested in the President. Perhaps this implies a
corresponding preclusion of state foreign policy, by negative
implication. It is widely believed that the grant of power over
interstate commerce in Article I, Section 8, creates by negative
implication a "dormant" Commerce Clause precluding some state
regulations of interstate commerce.23 ' Likewise, because the power
to raise and support armies is granted to Congress and because the
President is made Commander-in-Chief, one would be constitutionally suspicious of state laws purporting to regulate the U.S.
military. 232 Perhaps the negative implication of the President's
foreign affairs powers has a similar effect. 3
On the other hand, perhaps it does not. The Constitution already
contains a method for invalidating state laws interfering with
federal policy: the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. 2 S4 Federal policy
228. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 273 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).

229. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 446 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
230. See generally Fenton, supranote 21; Schmahmann & Finch, supranote 21.
231. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
232. See Ramsey, supra note 21, at 390-95, 429-32.

233. See id. (suggesting but ultimately rejecting this argument). For a related argument
that the Presidents power to negotiate with foreign governments creates a "dormant"
exclusion ofstate activities designed to influence foreign governments, see Edward Swaine,
NegotiatingFederalism:StateBargainingand theDormantTreaty Power,49 DUKEL.J. 1127

(2000).
234. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (making federal statutes and treaties supreme over state

law).
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reflected in a law or treaty overrides state law. If a state law
interferes with executive policy, Congress, pursuant to its
"necessary and proper" power, generally would appear to have the
ability to pass a law preempting that state policy. True, Congress
may decline to do so, but perhaps that is a salutary check upon
executive policymaking. If Congress does not find a state law
troubling, perhaps that law is not really a problem. As a historical
matter, states have passed laws with substantial impact on foreign
affairs without provoking foreign affairs crises."s5 Courts have very
rarely, and only relatively recently, struck down state laws as
conflicting with unenacted federal policy.286 It may be the case that
the third structural "problem" identified in Curtiss-Wrightis not
really a problem: the framers clearly understood the problem of
state interference in foreign affairs, and created a remedy through
Article VI of the Constitution.237
VI. CONCLUSION: WHY THE REJECTION OF CURTISS-WRIGHT

MATTERS
This Article concludes that Curtiss-Wright's theory of
extraconstitutional foreign affairs powers is both ahistorical and
unnecessary. Contrary to Curtiss-Wright'shistorical assertions, the
Constitution was not drafted with a background assumption of
inherent powers in foreign affairs. This is clear for three reasons.
First, the constitutional text itself delegates and allocates core
foreign affairs powers directly, which would be unusual if inherent
powers were widely assumed. 3 s Second, the drafters explained the
foreign affairs powers of the national government under the new
Constitution as grants of power, not as confirmations of existing
inherent powers.23 9 No one suggested that the Constitution's grants
235. See Goldsmith, supranote 6, at 1655-58 (discussing such laws, including California's
anti-alien acts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the Negro Seamen
Acts enacted by several southern states between 1822 and 1860).
236. See id. at 1643-63 (discussing history ofjudicial activities in this regard).
237. See generallyGoldsmith, supranote 6 (making this argument on the basis ofhistory
and practice); Ramsey, supra note 21 (making this argument on the basis of the original
understandingofthe Constitution); PeterJ. SpiroForeignRelationsFederalism,70U. COW.
L. REV. 1223 (1999) (making this argument on the basis of modem practicalities).
238. See supra Part H.A.
239. See supra Part ILB.
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offoreign affairs powers were superfluous, although members of the
constitutional generation were quick to point out superfluous
provisions in other contexts. Third, the Articles of Confederationan important model for the Constitution in the foreign affairs
area-had no concept of inherent foreign affairs powers. 4 The text
of the Articles did not grant Congress certain key foreign affairs
powers-such as the power to regulate foreign commerce and the
power to enforce treaties and the law of nations-and Congress
therefore thought it lacked these powers."' No one suggested that
Congress had these powers inherently. The only remedy for
Congress's lack of textual foreign affairs powers was thought to be
amendment, a strategy pursued piecemeal and without success in
the mid-1780s, and ultimately accomplished by the Constitution's
grant of broader textual powers. 2 Thus, without entering into the
broad debates about state and federal sovereignty that have often
obscured discussion of Curtiss-Wright, it can be said with
confidence that the Curtiss-Wrighttheory simply does not describe
the constitutional generation's understanding of foreign affairs
power.
Resort to a theory of extraconstitutional power in foreign affairs
is, moreover, unnecessary to make sense of the Constitution.
Although the Constitution's treatment of foreign affairs power has
been described as sparse and incomplete, that does not seem to be
an accurate characterization. If the executive-vesting clause of
Article II, Section 1m is construed to give residual foreign affairs
power to the President, as both Hamilton and Jefferson construed
it, a fairly complete picture of the allocation of foreign affairs power
can be developed without reference to extraconstitutional sources.'"
A theory of foreign affairs power based on the executive-vesting
clause results in a system not unlike that of Curtiss-Wright: the
"unallocated" foreign affairs powers are powers of the federal
government, and within the federal government they are, at least
in the first instance, powers of the President."45 One might wonder,
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See supra Part HIL
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part ll.B.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President....").
See supra Part V.
See id.

444

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:379

therefore, whether the debate over the Curtiss-Wright theory has
any practical consequences. Does it matter whether the source of
power is the executive-vesting clause or something outside the
Constitution? Those who defend broad presidential power under
the Curtiss-Wright theory will, upon reconceptualization, defend
it upon a broad theory of the executive-vesting clause. Those who
think that the President's inherent power is limited will, on reconceptualization, think that the executive-vesting clause has
limited scope.
The shift from Curtiss-Wright to the executive-vesting clause
matters for two reasons. First, the debate over inherent powers and
state sovereignty reaches beyond foreign affairs. This study does
not seek to resolve these broader matters, but it is relevant to them
in one important respect. The supposed existence of inherent
foreign affairs power may be used as support for the existence of
other inherent powers, and as evidence that state sovereignty has
other inherent limitations. Although I take no position on the
existence of other inherent powers or limitations, I do argue that
there are no inherent powers or limitations in foreign affairs-and
that arguments for other inherent powers or limitations must be
judged upon their own merits, without reference to foreign affairs
analogies.
Second, the theory of the executive-vesting clause, although
superficially similar to the theory of Curtiss-Wright, is in
application less hospitable to open-ended presidential powers.
Consider two examples that I have discussed at greater length
elsewhere. First, does the President have the power to make
executive agreements preemptive of state law? Under a CurtissWright theory, it is easy to argue that the President's inherent
foreign affairs power includes the power to make executive
agreements and the power to give them preemptive status."6 Under
an executive-vesting clause theory, the second part of the claim is
much more difficult. The traditional power of the chief executive, as
exemplified to the constitutional generation by the British monarch,
did not include the power of domestic lawmaking by executive

246. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-32 (1937) (reaching this conclusion
in part on the basis of Curtiss-Wright).
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agreement. 7 If the executive-vesting clause reflects the power of
the traditional chief executive, that power would not be included.
Moreover, once the power to make executive agreements is thought
of as a constitutionalpower, it is much more difficult to explain how
it could be preemptive even though not included in Article VI, which
is the way that other constitutional powers are made preemptive."8
As a result, the executive-vesting clause theory-but not the
Curtiss-Wright theory-appears to preclude a presidential
lawmaking power by executive agreement. 49
A related example is the question of state power in foreign
affairs. Under a Curtiss-Wrighttheory, it is easy to say that state
interference in presidential foreign policy is precluded by the idea
of national sovereigntyY Under an executive-vesting clause theory,
the claim is more difficult. If presidential power in foreign affairs
arises from the executive-vesting clause, and there is no other
constitutional provision generally excluding the states from foreign
affairs, the exclusion-if there is one-must arise from a negative
implication from the executive-vesting clause.2 5 ' As I have argued
elsewhere,25 however, this theory is subject to various objections,
not the least of which is the constitutional generation's disfavor of
negative implications against state power. 58 In short, as with
247. See James Wilson, Lectureson Law (1790-91), reprintedin 1 WnSON, supra note 97,
at 440 (discussing traditional understanding of executive power and concluding that "[t]he
person at the head of the executive department had authority, not to make, or alter, or
dispense with the laws"); Ramsey, supranote 215, at 218-29.
248. See Ramsey, supra note 215, at 219-21.
249. See id. at 235-40 (concluding that the executive-vesting clause gives the President
power to make executive agreements, but that executive agreements do not have the status
of domestic law).
250. See Clark, supranote 7, at 1296.
251. See Ramsey, supra note 21, at 390-403.
252. See id. at 403-32.
253. See 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES, supra note 3, at 391 (statement of George Nicolas to the
Virginia Convention)
[In everyinstance where the Constitution intends that the general government
shall exercise power any exclusively of the state governments, words of
exclusion are particularly inserted. Consequently, in every case where such
words of exclusion are not inserted, the power is concurrent to the state
governments and Congress, unless where itis impossible that the power should

be exercised by both.
Id; THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that a negative implication
against state power would arise from an affirmative grant of federal power only where "a
similar authority in the States would 6 e absolutely and totally contraryand repugnant").
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executive agreements, it is much more difficult to claim a broad
presidential power when that power is based on a specific
constitutional provision than if it is based on the inherent (and
intangible) "necessary concomitants of nationality."2 4

254. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).

